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The thesis has three chapters. Each chapter addresses a specific economic problem in 
contemporary China using applied-microeconomic methods. 
The first chapter studies the effects of culture on the destination choice of FDI. Recent 
economic research has started to consider culture as an important determinant of economic 
activities. In this study, I identify the casual effects of cultural ties on the destination choice of 
foreign direct investment using a fuzzy spatial regression discontinuity design. Speaking the 
same Chinese dialects is used to measure cultural ties among Chinese people. I find 
discontinuous increases in investment from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (HMT) to Mainland 
China across the geographic borders of Chinese linguistic dialect zones. The share of HMT firms 
located just inside a region that speaks the same dialects as HMT is 5–7 percentage points (20 
percent) higher than those located just outside. The increase in investments from HMT also 
generates positive local spillovers that raise the productivity of domestic firms. A 1-percentage-
point increase in the HMT firm share raises domestic firms’ productivity in the same location 
and industry by 1.7–2.8 percent. 
The second chapter studies the pattern of coresidence between elderly Chinese parents and 
their adult children. Coresidence between elderly parents and their married adult children is a 
common phenomenon in East Asian societies. We analyze theoretically and empirically with 
which adult child parents coreside when the extended family has multiple adult children and show 
that this decision-making process can be rationalized. To be specific, we find evidence that 
suggests division of labor among family members through the choice of coresidence. 
Theoretically, we show that when parents can help children with housework, they will coreside 
with higher-educated children whose opportunity cost of housework is higher. On the other hand, 
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when parents need help from children in housework labor, they will coreside with lower-educated 
children whose opportunity cost of housework is lower. By adopting a dataset containing 
information on parents and their married adult children, we find our two hypotheses are supported 
among families from rural China. The probability of coresidence is positively associated with 
relative education of the children when parents can provide help, and negatively associated with 
education when parents need help. 
The third chapter studies the impacts of the Three Gorges Dam (TGD) on climate change 
and agricultural production. Can man-made megaprojects, such as hydroelectric dams, cause 
permanent climate change by dramatically altering natural landscapes? Using a difference-in-
differences empirical design, we confirm that the TGD, the largest hydroelectric dam in the 
world, has increased the air temperature in the reservoir region and caused an unexpected 
decrease in precipitation in the vast downstream region along the Yangtze River. This decline in 
precipitation has negatively affected the crop yields of rice in the downstream region, which is 
the main grain grown in this area. However, farmers’ adaptation to this long-run climate shock 
has been limited and slow. Instead of enhancing economic efficiency by switching to drought-
resistant crops, engaging in non-farm employment or mechanizing production, they have chosen 
to significantly increase short-run factor inputs, such as land, labor and irrigation expenditures, in 
order to maintain their output of rice. As a result, the decrease in rice yields persists and has not 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL TIES ON FDI AND SPILLOVERS TO 
DOMESTIC FIRMS: IDENTIFICATION FROM BORDERS OF CHINESE DIALECT 
ZONES………………………………………………………………………………………........1 
CHAPTER 2: WHO CORESIDES WITH PARENTS? AN ANALYSIS BASED ON 
SIBLING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE…………………………………………………59 
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACTS OF THE THREE GORGES DAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION: ARE THERE LONG RUN 
ADAPTATIONS?………………………………………………………………………………92 
REFERENCE………………………………………………………………………………….127 




















CHAPTER 1: THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL TIES ON FDI AND SPILLOVERS TO 




Recent economic research has begun exploring culture as a possible determinant of economic 
phenomena (Guiso et al., 2006; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). For example, cultural traits can 
affect values and preferences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Atkin, 2016), economic policies and 
economic institutions (Greif, 1994; Guiso et al., 2004; Alesina et al., 2015). Also, cultural 
similarities and cultural ties have been shown to affect patterns of economic exchange (Guiso et 
al. 2009), especially international trade (Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Chiswick, 2008; Melitz, 
2008; Felbermayr and Toubal, 2010; Egger and Lassmann, 2012; Falck et al., 2012; Sauter, 
2012; Melitz and Toubal, 2014; Egger and Lassmann, 2015). 
 All works on culture and economics have faced main challenges in their attempts to claim 
a causal link. First, it is usually hard to isolate the impact of culture from other correlated 
economic and institutional environment. Second, the outcome variables can also affect culture in 
the long run, which create reverse causality from economics to culture (Guiso et al., 2006). 
In this study, I show the casual effects of cultural ties on the destination choice of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) using a new identification strategy, which explores discontinuous 
changes in investments from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) to Mainland China across 
the geographical borders of Chinese dialect zones.1 Cultural ties are measured by whether a 
region in Mainland China speaks the same types of Chinese dialects as HMT. People who speak 
                                                          
1 Egger and Lassmann (2015) use a similar identification strategy to study the effects of cultural similarity on trade 
in Switzerland.  
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the same Chinese dialect share the same cultural origins; therefore, dialect groups can be used to 
categorize Chinese people into sub-cultural groups. Figure 1.1 shows the two Chinese dialect 
zones studied in this research. Regions in the Cantonese dialect zone speak the same dialect as 
Hong Kong and Macau.2 Similarly, regions in the Min dialect zone speak the same dialect as the 
majority of Taiwanese. Using a fuzzy spatial regression discontinuity design, I compare locations 
that are very close to the geographical borders of these two common dialect zones. I find that the 
share of HMT firms in zip codes located just inside the common dialect zones is 5–7 percentage 
points (20 percent) higher than zip codes just outside. This finding implies that HMT firms are 
more likely to invest in regions in Mainland China that share the same cultural origins as HMT. 
This empirical design can help to identify a cleaner causal effect of culture on economic 
activities than found in previous studies in three ways. First, I compare locations that are 
geographically close to each other within the same country. As a result, these locations are more 
homogeneous in unobservable characteristics than prior cross-country or cross-region analyses. 
Second, I isolate the effects of culture from the effects of economic institutions and economic 
policies by studying dialect borders, which do not coincide with administrative borders. Since 
county-level administrative borders determine variations in policies and institutions in China, 
studying variations in culture (dialects) within the same administrative county allows me to hold 
other factors constant and identify the net effects of culture. Third, I use the location of the 
cultural borders before China started to receive investments from HMT to rule out the possibility 
of reverse causality.  
                                                          




The increase in investments from HMT to Mainland China across the common dialect 
borders due to cultural ties can be further employed to identify spillovers from FDI to domestic 
firms. Many developing countries adopt policies to attract FDI in hopes that the presence of 
foreign firms will generate positive spillovers to domestic firms. Exploring variations across 
common dialect borders, I find that investments from HMT to Mainland China generate positive 
local horizontal spillovers that increase the productivity of domestic Chinese firms. These 
positive spillovers are only identified in industries in which HMT firms are relatively more 
productive, indicating that this increase in productivity is more likely to be caused by spillovers 
rather than the direct effects of different cultures. In terms of magnitude, a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the share of HMT firms across the dialect borders raises the productivity of domestic 
firms, measured in total factor productivity (TFP) following Brandt et al. (2012) and Ackerberg 
et al. (2015), in the same location and industry by around 1.7–2.8 percent. 
The validity of the fuzzy spatial regression discontinuity design and the identification of 
spillovers are based on two important assumptions, which are tested in several additional 
empirical tests. The first assumption is that identifying the effects of culture on FDI requires that 
factors other than dialect should change continuously at the borders such that the discontinuous 
change in the share of HMT firms is only caused by the variation in dialects. I conduct the 
following four tests to support this assumption. First, I show that observable non-economic 
covariates, such as demographic and geographic characteristics, change continuously at the 
dialect borders. Second, the share of foreign firms from countries other than HMT does not 
discontinuously change at the borders, which indicates that zip codes that speak the same dialects 
as HMT do not attract more FDI overall, but only from HMT. Third, the share of HMT firms 
does not discontinuously change at a placebo dialect border (Wu dialect border) that is correlated 
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with neither Cantonese nor Min culture, which confirms that dialect borders without specific 
cultural meanings associated with them do not directly affect economic outcomes. Fourth, the 
share of HMT firms does not discontinuously change at placebo dialect borders generated by 
moving the actual dialect borders arbitrarily inward or outward by 100 km. In order for spillovers 
to be identified, the second assumption is that a common dialect must be found to affect the 
productivity of domestic firms only by attracting more investment from HMT. This argument is 
supported by three additional tests. First, the productivity of domestic firms in industries that are 
not influenced by HMT investment does not discontinuously change at the dialect borders. 
Second, the positive spillovers are only identified in industries in which HMT firms are more 
productive than domestic firms. In industries in which HMT firms are less productive than 
domestic firms, the productivity of all domestic firms is very similar across the dialect borders. 
Third, the productivity of domestic firms does not change discontinuously at placebo dialect 
borders. 
In addition to the literature on the link between culture and economic activities, this study 
also contributes to the literature on identifying spillovers from FDI to domestic firms.3 Previous 
studies on FDI spillovers have primarily followed the empirical framework pioneered by Aitken 
and Harrison (1999) and further developed by Javorcik (2004). This framework focuses on the 
variation across industries in the presence of foreign firms. However, as noted by recent studies 
(Lu et al., 2017), multinational firms’ decisions to invest in specific industries are endogenous,4 
                                                          
3 The theoretical framework of the analysis is based on Rodriguez-Clare (1996). For a summary of empirical 
findings, please refer to the meta-analyses conducted by Gorg and Strobl (2001), Harvranek and Irsova (2011), and 
Irsova and Havranek (2013). The authors conclude that previous empirical studies reach the following four 
conclusions. First, horizontal spillovers are, on average, zero. Second, spillovers to domestic suppliers through 
backward linkages are, on average, positive. Third, FDI generates small spillovers to domestic buyers through 
forward linkages. Finally, the signs and magnitudes of spillovers depend systematically on the characteristics of the 
domestic economy and foreign investors. 
4 When foreign firms decide whether to enter the market of a host country, they take into account the productivity of 
that country’s domestic firms. For example, foreign firms are likely to have an advantage in products that domestic 
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which can significantly bias the results.5 Instead of using variation across industries, I use 
variation in FDI across regions caused by cultural ties to identify spillovers, which dramatically 
changes the sign of the horizontal spillovers compared to the traditional empirical framework. In 
contrast to the positive local horizontal spillovers identified from exploring variation in FDI 
across dialect borders, I find negative spillovers using variation in FDI across industries. This 
finding indicates that previous studies that identify spillovers using variation across industries 
may suffer from endogeneity concerns. 
This research also sheds light on the empirical study of the barriers to the diffusion of 
development (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). I find that positive 
productivity spillovers are more likely to occur in regions in Mainland China that share the same 
language/culture as HMT. Therefore, this is the first study to empirically show that linguistic or 
cultural differences can become a barrier to (and prevent the spread of) productivity spillovers 
from developed economies to developing countries.  
Finally, this study also contributes to the literature on the impact of colonial history on 
economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). I identify a new 
mechanism that former colonies of Western countries or Japan (Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan 
in this case) can generate productivity spillovers to home countries (Mainland China) through 
unique cultural linkages.  
                                                          
firms are not good at producing, so they invest in producing those products. Thus, many previous studies find a 
negative correlation between the presence of foreign firms and the productivity of domestic firms. However, this 
correlation is caused by foreign firms selectively entering certain industries rather than negative horizontal 
productivity spillovers. 
5 Lu et al. (2017) use changes in Chinese FDI regulation policies as the identification strategy to address this 
endogeneity problem and find negative national-level horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms. The 
magnitude of spillovers is much larger than those estimated using models that do not address potential endogeneity 
problems, indicating significant bias in an OLS framework. 
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 The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information about Chinese dialect borders and investments from HMT to Mainland China. I 
highlight evidence showing that the geographical distribution of people who speak a specific 
dialect changes discontinuously at the dialect borders. Section 3 discusses the data used to 
calculate HMT investments and productivity spillovers. Section 4 discusses empirical strategies. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results and discusses possible mechanisms. Section 6 discusses 
the study’s limitations and concludes. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
1.2.1 Dialect Zones in China from the Language Atlas of China 
In this section, I describe how I use the dialect zones defined in the Language Atlas of China to 
measure linguistic differences and cultural ties. The borders of the dialect zones have two 
characteristics that facilitate the study. First, they do not coincide with administrative borders in 
many places, which allows me to identify the effects of culture net of the impacts of economic 
policy. Second, the geographical distribution of populations from different cultural groups 
changes discontinuously across these borders, which justifies the use of a spatial regression 
discontinuity design. 
I measure cultural ties according to whether a location in Mainland China speaks the 
same Chinese dialect as Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Speaking the same dialect indicates 
lower communication costs as well as similar cultural origins of the population. People who 
speak different dialects are so distinct that dialect significantly affects all kinds of economic 
activities. For example, Chen et al. (2014) show that the ability to speak Shanghainese generates 
positive returns in the labor market in Shanghai.  
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I use maps from the Language Atlas of China6 to define the geographical borders of 
locations that speak different dialects in Mainland China.7 These maps, published by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, show the geographical distribution of major Chinese dialects. 
Linguists and anthropologists constructed them based on fieldworks in which they collected data 
on the dialect spoken by the majority of the population in each sampled Chinese village. Figure 
1.3, which is a map of Jiangyin County, illustrates how geographical borders between different 
dialects are drawn in these maps. The county8 is separated into multiple villages. Linguists and 
anthropologists have qualitative information on the dialect used by the majority of the population 
in these villages. Different dialects are visually represented in the figure by different notations 
and the borders of dialect zones are drawn between villages that speak different dialects. 
An interesting feature of the dialect borders is that they do not always coincide with 
county-level administrative borders, which usually determine differences in economic policies. 
This is partly because the latter were often determined by the location of historical administrative 
borders (He, 2003; Hu and Yao, 2011), which change over time due to strategic concerns (Gao 
and Long, 2014). Cultural borders tend to be more stable over time. Nor do dialect borders 
necessarily coincide with the major rivers in the area (see Figure A1). Figure 1.4 shows an 
example of the relationship between dialect borders and administrative borders. The dark black 
line, which indicates a dialect border, passes through several counties, separating them into 
                                                          
6 I use the maps published in 1987 (Wurm et al., 1987) to define dialect borders. A new version of the maps was 
published in 2008, which confirms that the Min and Cantonese dialect borders did not change significantly from the 
previous version. 
7 I use the definition of major dialect groups to define cultural groups. Major dialect groups can be further divided 
into more detailed cultural subgroups\For example, the Min dialect zone can be further divided into the Southern 
Min dialect zones and the Northern Min dialect zones. Because the Southern Min dialect group is more similar to 
Taiwan, we should expect most of the effects to be driven by the southern portion of the zone. Indeed, I conducted a 
robustness check by excluding the northern part of the Min dialect border and found that the main results did not 
change.  




regions that speak different dialects. The points in this figure indicate the centroid of zip codes. 
My identification strategy compares zip codes within the same county on two sides of the dialect 
border. Thus, any policy differentiations at the county level are controlled by including county 
fixed effects. 
 Using dialect borders to study discontinuous changes in investments from HMT requires 
an important identification assumption: that the geographic distribution of people who speak a 
specific dialect and belong to a certain cultural group changes discontinuously at the dialect 
borders. 9  However, this assumption is only ambiguously supported by the literature of 
anthropology and linguistics. Some early studies claim that the borders of dialect zones clearly 
demarcate the boundary of people who speak a certain dialect, and some zones do indeed have a 
clear dividing line, in which villages on either side of the border speak drastically different 
languages (He, 2003). However, later studies note that changes in some places are more continuous 
due to cultural communication between villages on both sides of the cultural border (Simmons et 
al., 2006). Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be directly tested because there is no 
comprehensive data to describe the geographic distribution of Chinese people according to what 
dialect they speak. However, this assumption can be indirectly tested by studying the geographic 
distribution of Chinese surnames. People from different cultural groups have drastically different 
distributions of surnames. Therefore, the distributions of representative surnames can be used to 
speculate the distribution of dialect groups. 
 To study the geographic distribution of representative surnames, I use the 10 most common 
surnames (ranked by population share) in each Chinese dialect zone as defined by Du and Yuan 
(1993). In the two dialect zones studied here (Min and Cantonese [Yue]), the distribution of 
                                                          
9 Some recent economic studies have documented that cultural borders can generate discontinuous effects on 
economic outcomes (Egger and Lassmann, 2015; Becker et al., 2016; Lowes, 2017). 
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surnames is drastically different from other dialect zones. For example, “Lin (林)” is the second 
most common surname for the Min zone, and “Liang (梁)” is the second most common surname 
for the Cantonese zone. However, these two surnames are not ranked in the top 10 for any other 
Chinese dialect zones. I use the three most common surnames grouped together as the 
representative surnames for the Min (Chen [陈], Lin [林] and Huang [黄]) and Cantonese (Yue) 
dialect zones (Chen [陈], Liang [梁] and Li [李]). The empirical results are similar if I use these 
surnames separately. 
Using data from the 2005 Chinese population census, I document discontinuous changes 
in the geographic distribution of representative surnames across the dialect borders. I calculate the 
population share of representative surnames in each county.10 Figure 1.5 plots the population share 
of representative surnames by distance to the dialect borders. Figure 1.5.1 shows the population 
share of representative surnames of the Min dialect group at the border of the Min dialect zone. 
The horizontal axis denotes the distance to the dialect borders; negative values indicate that the 
location is inside the dialect border. The vertical axis denotes the population share of representative 
surnames. The figure shows a significant discontinuous drop when moving from inside the border 
to outside. Figure 1.5.2 plots the population share of representative surnames of the Cantonese 
(Yue) dialect group at the border of the Cantonese (Yue) dialect zone. It illustrates a discontinuous 
(but smaller) drop than that of the Min dialect zone. Both exercises support the assumption that 
the geographic distribution of populations from different dialect groups discontinuously changes 
at the dialect borders defined as in the Language Atlas of China.  
                                                          
10 The most detailed geographic information in the Chinese population census is at the county level. Therefore, it is 
not possible to test discontinuous changes in the geographic distribution of representative surnames at the zip code 
level due to data limitations. However, the analysis at the county level convincingly shows that dialect (culture) 
changes discontinuously at the dialect borders defined as in the Language Atlas of China. 
10 
 
1.2.2 Investments from HMT in Mainland China 
This study links cultural ties to investments from HMT in Mainland China. A large proportion of 
FDI in China comes from regions that are part of China, but became colonies of Western 
countries or Japan, such as HMT.  
 When China initiated its open-door policy in 1978 and became more integrated into the 
world economy, it experienced a rapid growth in FDI. An important feature of FDI in China is 
that a large proportion of investment comes from regions that are part of China but were 
historically separated from China and became colonies of Britain, Portugal and Japan. Thus, 
these regions established different economic systems and experienced different paths of 
economic development. HMT had well-established market institutions and were far ahead of 
Mainland China in economic development when China started to open up. Figure 1.2 shows how 
investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan11 as a share of FDI in Mainland China have changed 
since the 1990s. The share of investments from Hong Kong was around 30 to 40 percent until 
2005, and then increased to around 60 percent. The share of Taiwanese investments was around 
10 percent in the 1990s but has been declining over time.12 Investments from HMT are regulated 
in the same way as other types of FDI. Entry of HMT investments into certain industries is 
regulated due to strategic concerns.                  
                                                          
11 The share of Macau investment is very small and thus not emphasized in this study. 
12 Calculating investments from HMT suffers from the problem of “round trip FDI” in Mainland China. Some 
domestic investors from the mainland move their assets to Hong Kong before investing in Mainland China in order 
to benefit from FDI-encouraging policies. My identification strategy helps overcome this problem, because true 
investments from HMT are more likely to be affected by the dialect borders than “round trip FDI” that is from all 
parts of Mainland China. Therefore, the discontinuous gap at the dialect borders is more likely to represent 
differences in true HMT investments instead of differences in “round trip FDI.” As an additional test, I estimate the 
discontinuous gap in investments from HMT only at the Min dialect border because investments from Taiwan are 
less likely to be affected by “round trip FDI” than those from Hong Kong. The results are shown in Appendix A9. I 
find that the magnitude of the discontinuous increase is similar to (and even slightly larger than) the baseline model 
(using both the Min and Cantonese dialect borders). Therefore, the effects of “round trip” FDI in the baseline model 
should not be very large.  
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Unique cultural ties with Mainland China are believed to explain the large share of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan investment found in previous studies (Zhang, 2005). In an underdeveloped 
market environment, cultural ties help investors reduce transaction costs (Dai et al., 2016), build 
trust and protect property rights.  
An important benefit of using investments from HMT as a case to study the effects of 
culture and FDI is that the economic influences of the dialect borders are unlikely to be 
correlated with unobservable local characteristics in Mainland China. This is because the dialect 
borders carried no economic meaning until HMT historically became colonies of Western 
countries (or Japan) and took very different routes of economic development than Mainland 
China. It was only after the divergence due to colonization that regions speaking Cantonese, or 
the Min dialect could take advantage of their economically more developed cultural brothers. As 
a result of colonization, the fact that HMT became economically more developed is independent 
of any economic factors in Mainland China.  
Nor do the economic influences of the dialect borders represent the long-run effects of 
trading with HMT: China followed a centrally planned economy and was closed off from the 
world when the economies of HMT took off.  HMT started to have an economic impact on 
Mainland China through FDI only after the 1980s. 
 In addition to the discontinuous changes at the dialect borders, I also explore the 
heterogeneous effects of the dialect borders across industries by Chinese FDI regulation policies, 
which restrict FDI from entering certain industries. Lu et al. (2017) show that changes in FDI 
regulation policies affected the inflow of FDI into regulated industries.13 The main goal of FDI 
                                                          
13 Lu et al. (2017) focus on changes in these regulation policies over time, while I only examine industrial variation. 
Because my study is conducted at a very small geographical level (zip code level), changes in regulation policies 
only happen in a small proportion of the sample and therefore do not generate enough power to identify the effects 
on domestic firms. For this reason, this study analyzes at the two-digit industry level. If I analyzed at the four-digit 
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entry-regulation policies is to protect domestic firms in the same industry from competition from 
foreign investments. The 1997 central government guidelines for FDI regulation classified 
products into four categories: (1) FDI is supported, (2) FDI is permitted, (3) FDI is restricted and 
(4) FDI is prohibited. The list of “restricted” products changed upon China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which generated a new catalog. I check at the two-
digit industry level whether any goods produced by a specific industry in a given year were listed 
in either the new or old catalog. If any goods produced by a two-digit industry were listed as 
either “restricted to FDI” or “forbidden to FDI,” I treat that two-digit industry as being regulated 
in that year. I create an industry-year dummy variable Regulation, which indicates whether a 
specific industry was subject to FDI entry-regulation policy in a specific year. Summary statistics 




Data on HMT investment is calculated using firm-level data from the Chinese Industrial Census 
from 1998 to 2006. The census collects data on all manufacturing firms with sales above 5 
million RMB15. One limitation of the data is that firms from HMT are put into a single category. 
Ideally, I should address changes of Hong Kong and Macau firms at the Cantonese border as 
well as changes of Taiwanese firms at the Min dialect border. However, given the data structure, 
it is impossible to separate Hong Kong and Macau firms from Taiwan firms. Therefore, I make 
                                                          
industry level, each zip code would have, on average, fewer than two firms. Thus, spillovers cannot be identified at 
the four-digit level. 
14 Appendix A4 shows that the geographical distribution of the share of regulated industries is continuous across the 
dialect borders. 
15 Equivalent to 0.8 million USD. 
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an additional assumption that investments from Taiwan are not affected by the Cantonese border, 
and that investments from Hong Kong and Macau are not affected by the Min dialect border.16 
Then, I combine the analysis of the two borders into one framework and address the changes in 
investments from HMT at the Cantonese and Min dialect borders. If the assumptions were true, 
changes at the Cantonese border would reflect changes in investments from Hong Kong and 
Macau, while changes at the Min border would reflect changes in investments from Taiwan. 
Firm-level variables such as output, value added, employment and real capital are calculated 
using the framework and deflators provided by Brandt et al. (2012). 
 Then, the firm-level data is aggregated at the zip code level.1718 I calculate road distance 
from each zip code to both dialect borders and use the shorter distance of the two to define the 
distance from a specific zip code to the nearest dialect border. For each zip code, I calculate the 
distance to Hong Kong if the nearest border is the Cantonese border, and the distance to Taipei if 
the nearest border is the Min dialect border. 
 
1.4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES 
This section explains the empirical strategies I use to study the causal effects of cultural ties on 
FDI and identify spillovers from FDI. First, I use a regression discontinuity design to identify the 
                                                          
16 While this assumption cannot be directly tested, its validity is strengthened by the placebo tests described later in 
section 1.4, which show that investments from other foreign countries do not change discontinuously across the 
borders. Thus, I also expect that investments from a region that is not related to the specific dialect should not be 
affected by the border. According to this assumption, the measurement error of the dependent variable should be 
independent from the common dialect. Therefore, the coefficient on speaking the same dialect will not be biased.  
17 I use the geographic locations of current zip codes in the analysis. The locations of some zip codes could change 
over time, but I do not have information to track the changes in zip codes across years. As a robustness check, I use 
the geographic locations of zip codes as of 2005 (data provided by the Michigan China Data Center) and find similar 
empirical results. (The 2005 version has fewer zip codes, which significantly reduces the sample size). 
18 The geographic distribution of zip codes passes the RD density test by Cattaneo et al. (2016) (T-value 0.81; P-
value 0.42) at the dialect borders. Therefore, there is no evidence of manipulating the distribution of zip codes 




discontinuous increase in HMT investments at the dialect borders, which represents the effects of 
cultural ties on the destination choice of FDI. Second, I show how the discontinuous increase in 
HMT investments varies by industries’ regulation status and HMT firms’ productivity. Third, I 
use the discontinuous increase in HMT investments at the dialect borders as an instrument to 
identify horizontal spillovers from FDI. Finally, I discuss additional tests to check the validity of 
my identification assumptions. 
 
1.4.1. Effects of common dialect on investments from HMT (zip code-level analysis) 
First, I use the spatial regression discontinuity design to estimate the discontinuous increase in 
investments from HMT at the borders of the two dialect zones. 
 I construct the dependent variable by aggregating firm-level data and calculating the 
share of HMT firms among all firms in zip code i and year t. The employment share of HMT 




 ,    (1.1) 
where 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑡 measures the total employment of firm 𝑓 in zip code i and year t; 𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑓𝑖𝑡 
measures the HMT equity share of firm 𝑓, and  Ω𝑖𝑡 is the set of all firms in zip code i and year t. 
The output share of HMT firms is calculated in a similar way using equation (1.2) as an 
alternative measure of the share of HMT firms. Table 1.1 shows that the average share of HMT 




 .                        (1.2) 
The empirical model of the spatial regression discontinuity design is specified as: 
𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑇𝑖 × 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑓(𝐷𝐶𝑖) + 𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                    (1.3) 
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where 𝑖 denotes zip code, t denotes year and j denotes county. 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 denotes the share of 
HMT firms in zip code i and year t. 𝑇𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating whether zip code i is 
located inside the common dialect zones. 𝐷𝑖 is the road distance from zip code i to the nearest 
dialect border. 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) are polynomials of the road distance 𝐷𝑖. 𝑓(𝐷𝐶𝑖) are polynomials of the 
distance from zip code i to Hong Kong (if the nearest dialect border is Cantonese)19 or Taipei (if 
the nearest dialect border is Min).  𝑐𝑗 are county fixed effects and 𝜂𝑡 are year fixed effects. Thus, 
𝛽1 captures the discontinuous changes in the share of HMT firms at the dialect borders. 
 I estimate the polynomial model specified as equation (1.3) with a bandwidth of 40 km, 
which is approximately the size of a county in terms of road distance in China. Within the 
bandwidth, about 63 percent of the zip codes are inside the common dialect borders. As a 
robustness check, I also estimate a local linear regression model with bandwidth optimally 
chosen:  
𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑇𝑖 + 𝜃2𝐷𝑖 + 𝜃3𝑇𝑖 × 𝐷𝑖 + 𝑓(𝐷𝐶𝑖) + 𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                 (1.4) 
in which linear models are used to model distance to the dialect borders and optimal bandwidth 
is chosen using the cross-validation method proposed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008). 
 
1.4.2. Heterogeneous effects across industries by industrial characteristics 
Next, I study the heterogeneous effects of common dialect on HMT investments across industries 
to strengthen my identification strategy. First, I compare industries subject to FDI entry 
regulations with those that are not and expect to find that the discontinuous increase in HMT 
investments is larger in magnitude in unregulated industries because of the lower entry costs. 
                                                          
19 Given that the share of Macau firms is very small compared to the share of Hong Kong firms, and the fact that 
Macau and Hong Kong are geographically close, I only control for distance to Hong Kong when evaluating zip 
codes located near the Cantonese dialect border.   
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Second, I compare industries in which HMT firms are more productive with those in which they 
are less productive and expect to find that the discontinuous gap is larger in industries with 
higher-productivity HMT firms. 
To test the heterogeneous effects by regulation, I estimate a model following a spatial 
regression discontinuity design at the firm level with interactions between dialect borders and 
regulations: 
𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑘𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿3𝑅𝑘𝑡 + 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑇𝑖 × 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑓(𝐷𝐶𝑖) + 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 +
                       𝜂𝑡 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                  (1.5) 
where the dependent variable 𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 denotes the HMT equity share of firm 𝑓 in zip code i, 
industry k and year t. 𝑅𝑘𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether industry k in year t was subject 
to FDI regulation.20 𝑇𝑖, 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) and 𝑓(𝐷𝐶𝑖) are defined in the same way as in equation (1.3). 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 
are firm-level control variables. 𝑐𝑗, 𝜂𝑡 and 𝛿𝑘 denote county, year and industry fixed effects, 
respectively. The parameter of interest is 𝛿2, and I expect 𝛿2 to be negative, indicating that the 
discontinuous increase in HMT investment at the dialect borders is smaller in industries subject 
to FDI entry regulations. This hypothesis indicates that the discontinuous increase in HMT 
investments at the dialect borders responds to a policy that specifically targets FDI. Therefore, 
the discontinuous increase at the dialect borders is more likely to be caused by FDI than by other 
unobservable factors. 
 To test the heterogeneous effects by the productivity of HMT firms, I estimate a model 
similar to model (5) with interactions between dialect borders and the productivity of HMT 
firms: 
                                                          
20 If a good that is produced by industry j is listed as either “restricted” or “forbidden” in year t, I code 𝑅𝑗𝑡 as 1. 
Goods that are listed as “forbidden” do not change much over time. Goods listed as “restricted” changed somewhat 
upon China’s accession to WTO. 
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𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑇𝑖 + 𝜌2𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑃𝑘 × 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑇𝑖 × 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑓(𝐷𝐶𝑖) + 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 +
                      𝛿𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  ,                                                                                                               (1.6) 
where 𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑃𝑘 is the average Total Factor Productivity (TFP) (defined in section 1.4.3) of HMT 
firms in industry k calculated using all HMT firms operating in Mainland China.21 The parameter 
of interest is 𝜌2, which I expect to be positive, indicating that HMT firms in industries with 
higher-productivity HMT firms are more likely to enter the market. Therefore, the discontinuous 
increase at the dialect borders will also become larger in magnitude. 
 
1.4.3. Identify horizontal spillovers from HMT investments 
Third, I use the discontinuous increase in the share of HMT firms at the dialect borders as the 
exogenous variation to estimate the effects of HMT investments on the productivity of domestic 
firms in the same industry and location in an instrumental variable framework. 
  The empirical model is estimated using a sample of all domestic firms (defined as having 
a foreign (including HMT) equity share of zero).22 The dependent variable is each firm’s TFP, 
which I calculate firstly using the method proposed by Brandt et al. (2012): 
ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑓𝑡) = (𝑞𝑓𝑡 − 𝑞?̅?) − 𝑆𝑓?̃?(𝑙𝑓𝑡 − 𝑙?̅?) − (1 − 𝑆𝑓?̃?)(𝑘𝑓𝑡 − 𝑘?̅?),   (1.7) 
where 𝑞𝑓𝑡, 𝑙𝑓𝑡 and 𝑘𝑓𝑡 are logarithms of firm 𝑓’s value added, labor and capital in year 𝑡. 𝑞?̅?, 𝑙?̅? 
and 𝑘?̅? are industry average logarithms of value added, labor and capital in year t. Labor is 
weighted by 𝑆𝑓?̃?, which denotes the share of wage in total value added, while capital is weighted 
by (1 − 𝑆𝑓?̃?).  𝑆𝑓?̃? is calculated as 𝑆𝑓?̃? = (𝑆𝑓𝑡 + 𝑆?̅?)/2, where 𝑆𝑓𝑡 is firm 𝑓’s share of wage in total 
                                                          
21 Using data on all HMT firms operating in Mainland China, I calculate the average TFP of HMT firms for each 
industry. This industry-level measure is applied to the regions around dialect borders to measure the advantage of 
HMT firms in each industry.  




value added in year 𝑡 and 𝑆?̅? is the industry average share of wage in total value added in year t. 
In this specification, each firm is compared with a hypothetical average firm in the industry, and 
productivity deviation from the average firm is captured by TFP. Table 1.1 shows that TFP 
estimated using this method has a mean close to zero and a standard deviation of around 1. 
 Since firms endogenously choose the share of labor in the production function (𝑆𝑓?̃?), 
measuring TFP using the method described in equation (1.7) may be biased. Therefore, I also 
follow the framework developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Ackerberg et al. (2015) to 
estimate an unbiased measure of 𝑆𝑓?̃? using non-parametric methods. Appendix A1 shows the 
detailed procedures used to calculate this alternative measure of TFP. 
 Then, I estimate spillovers from HMT investments to the TFP of domestic firms 
following the empirical model developed by Aitken and Harrison (1999). The baseline model has 
the following form: 
ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,      (1.8) 
where the dependent variable  ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡) is the TFP of firm 𝑓 in zip code 𝑖 , industry 𝑘 and 
year 𝑡 and the key independent variable 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡 measures the presence of 
HMT firms in the same industry and location as firm 𝑓. Thus, 𝛾1 captures horizontal spillovers 
from HMT firms to domestic firms. Following the literature, 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡 is 




  ,     (1.9) 
where 𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑚 denotes the HMT equity share of firm 𝑚; 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑚 denotes the total output of 
firm 𝑚; Ω𝑖𝑘𝑡 denotes all firms in zip code 𝑖, industry 𝑘 and year 𝑡. In short, the presence of HMT 
firms is measured by HMT equity-share-weighted total output over total output. 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 denote 
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firm-level control variables. 𝑐𝑗, 𝜂𝑡 and 𝛿𝑘 are county, year and industry fixed effects, 
respectively. Specifically, I control for the following firm-level variables: logarithm of total 
output, labor–capital ratio, logarithm of total exports, the number of years since the firm was 
established, and the output share of other foreign firms in the same location and industry. Total 
output and labor–capital ratio control for the effect of economies of scale on productivity; total 
exports control for the effect of trade on productivity, because regions from common dialect 
zones may have more opportunities to export to HMT; the number of years in business controls 
for the effect of firms’ experience in the industry on productivity; and the output share of other 
foreign firms controls for spillovers from other types of FDI.23 
To account for the fact that HMT firms endogenously choose which locations and 
industries they enter, I instrument the presence of HMT investments using the discontinuous 
increase at the dialect borders. I model the discontinuous changes in HMT investments at the 
dialect borders in a similar way to equation (1.3) but at the firm level:  
𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑖 + 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑇𝑖 × 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑓(𝐷𝐶𝑖) + 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 +
                                                           𝛿𝑘 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  ,                                                                            (1.10) 
where the dependent variable 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡 measures the presence of HMT firms 
in zip code 𝑖, industry 𝑘 and year 𝑡 specified as the key independent variable in equation (1.8); 𝑇𝑖 
is a dummy variable indicating whether zip code i is located inside the common dialect zones; 𝐷𝑖 
is the road distance from zip code i to the nearest dialect borders;  𝑓(𝐷𝑖) are polynomials of the 
road distance 𝐷𝑖. The other controls are the same as in equation (1.8).  In this model, 𝛼1 captures 
the discontinuous increase in the presence of HMT firms at the dialect borders.  
                                                          
23 Adding these control variables does not significantly affect the magnitude of the main results. 
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 In the second stage, I use the predicted presence of HMT firms from equation (1.10) in 
place of the actual presence of HMT firms in equation (1.8): 
ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡) = 𝜎0 + 𝜎1𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡̂ + 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑇𝑖 × 𝑓(𝐷𝑖) + 𝑓(𝐷𝐶𝑖) + 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 +
                            𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  .                                                                                       (1.11) 
The coefficient of interest, 𝜎1, captures changes in the productivity of domestic firms due to the 
discontinuous increase in HMT investments at the dialect borders. 
 
1.4.4. Identification assumptions and additional tests 
 Identifying these empirical models requires two important assumptions and this section 
discusses tests of their validity. First, factors other than dialect should change continuously at the 
borders such that the discontinuous changes in the share of HMT firms are only caused by the 
variation in dialect. Second, sharing a common dialect affects the productivity of domestic firms 
only by increasing investments from HMT. This section describes five tests I conducted to check 
the validity of these assumptions.  
 First, I check whether observable non-economic covariates change continuously at the 
dialect borders. I check two sets of variables that can be acquired at the zip code level in China: 
demographic variables from the population census of 2010 and geographic variables from 
corresponding maps. Specifically, I check the geographic distribution of the following variables 
at the dialect borders: total population, the share of people under 14, the share of people over 65, 
the share of people who hold local hukou,24 elevation and slope. 
                                                          
24 This term indicates people who are registered as “local people,” or those who are originally from the area. The 
difference between the total population and people of local hukou implies people who migrated into the zip code. 
Therefore, the population share of local hukou can be used to capture the degree of in-migration. 
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Second, it is possible that people on one side of a dialect border attract more investments 
due to differences in investment opportunities. To address this concern, I use the share of foreign 
firms from countries other than HMT (for example Japan and Korea) as the dependent variables 
in equation (1.3) and (1.4). I expect to find no significant discontinuity, which would indicate 
that regions inside the borders attract more FDI only from HMT.  
Third, language borders can generate unobservable variation other than culture. To 
address this concern, I analyze changes in the share of HMT firms at a placebo dialect border 
that is correlated with neither the Cantonese nor Min dialect. I choose the Wu dialect border 
around Shanghai (shown in Figure 1.11) to conduct this analysis because regions at this border 
are geographically close and economically comparable to those at the Cantonese and Min dialect 
borders. Continuous changes at the Wu dialect border indicate that the language border itself, 
without the specific cultural meaning attached, does not directly affect the outcome variables.  
Fourth, I create additional placebo dialect borders by arbitrarily moving the actual dialect 
borders inward and outward by 100 km. I expect to find continuous changes in both the share of 
HMT firms and the productivity of domestic firms at these placebo borders. 
Finally, culture may exert direct effects on productivity instead of affecting it by 
attracting more investments from HMT. Thus, I conduct another placebo test to check whether 
the productivity of domestic firms from industries that receive the least influence from HMT 
changes discontinuously at the borders.  Similarity in the productivity of these firms indicates 






1.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1.5.1. Results from graphs 
Before reporting detailed estimation results from the empirical models, I first show graphical 
evidence of discontinuous changes in the share of HMT firms at the dialect borders. Figure 1.6 
shows the geographical distribution of the share of HMT firms by their distance from the dialect 
borders. This graph shows the local linear fit of the data with an optimal bandwidth of 30 km.25 
In this figure, the horizontal axis indicates distance to the dialect borders; negative values 
indicate locations inside the common dialect borders (common dialect with HMT). The vertical 
axis denotes the employment share of HMT firms. Figure 1.6 clearly demonstrates a significant 
discontinuous drop in the share of HMT firms when moving from inside to outside the borders. 
 A potential problem of drawing conclusions only based on Figure 1.6 is that the 
discontinuous changes at the borders are a mixture of cultural and policy effects, because part of 
the dialect borders coincide with the administrative borders. To exclude the effects caused by 
policy variation at the administrative borders, I standardize the outcome variables by subtracting 
county means and dividing by county standard deviations.26 This process removes policy effects 
that are common to every zip code from the same county and permits within-county 
comparisons. Figure 1.7 shows the discontinuous changes in the share of HMT firms with 
standardized outcome variables. Figure 1.7.1 shows the distribution of employment shares, and 
Figure 1.7.2 shows the distribution of output shares.  
 Figure 1.7.1 illustrates that there is a significant drop in the standardized share of HMT 
firms at the dialect borders when moving from inside to outside the borders. Due to the process 
of standardization, the value of points that are farther away from the dialect borders approaches 
                                                          
25 Appendix A11 shows that the discontinuous increase in the share of HMT firms at the dialect borders is robust in 
magnitude when the bandwidth is changed from 20 km to 60 km. 
26 A county is a larger geographical area than a zip code. Each county may contain multiple zip codes.  
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zero27because the distribution of the average share of HMT firms at the county level is 
downward sloping. If a location is farther from the dialect border, it is more likely to be from a 
county in which a large proportion of zip codes is inside (outside) the common dialect borders 
and therefore the average share of HMT firms is high (low). A significant drop in the share of 
HMT firms across the dialect borders can only be observed in locations that are very close to the 
dialect borders. Figure 1.7.2 shows similar empirical patterns when I use the output share as an 
alternative measure of the share of HMT firms. 
 In Figure 1.8, I use the fourth-degree polynomials of distance to the dialect borders to fit 
the share of HMT firms (standardized). Similar to Figure 1.7, I observe a discontinuous drop in 
the share of HMT firms at the borders of the common dialect zones.  
 As one of the placebo tests, Figure 1.9 investigates whether similar discontinuous 
changes in the share of foreign firms from regions other than HMT can be observed at the dialect 
borders. Using the same specification as Figure 1.7, Figure 1.9 shows no discontinuous changes 
in the share of firms from other foreign countries, indicating that sharing a common dialect 
increases FDI by attracting more investment only from HMT.  
 
1.5.2. Main results 
This section shows that common dialect, which represents unique cultural ties, increases 
investments from HMT to Mainland China by around 5–7 percentage points at the dialect 
borders. This increase improves the productivity of domestic firms from the same industry and 
location, especially in industries in which the productivity of HMT firms is higher than domestic 
firms. 
                                                          
27 If cultural borders had no effects, the graph of the standardized distribution should be flat, since all points would 
fluctuate around 0 due to standardization. 
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Table 1.2 reports the effects of common dialect on investments from HMT estimated 
using the spatial regression discontinuity design (equation [1.3] and [1.4]) at the zip code level. I 
report the coefficients on the dummy variable indicating common dialect (𝛽1) in the table, which 
captures the discontinuous changes in the outcome variables at the dialect borders. I use 
employment share as the dependent variable in Panel A and output share as the dependent 
variable in Panel B. Columns (1) to (4), which are estimated using equation (1.3), represent 
separate estimations with the first- to fourth-degree polynomials of distance to the dialect borders 
as control variables. The bandwidth is 40 km, which is the approximate size of a county in 
China. Column (5) is estimated using a local linear model specified as in equation (1.4). The 
optimal bandwidth chosen by cross-validation is 30 km. I also include county fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, and polynomials of the distance to Hong Kong (or Taipei) as control variables in 
all specifications. 
 Panel A of Table 1.2 shows that common dialects discontinuously increase the 
employment share of HMT firms by around 5–7 percentage points at the borders of the dialect 
zones, which is about a 20 percent increase. The effects are similar in magnitude across all 
specifications, although they are less statistically significant when higher-degree polynomials are 
included as control variables.28 Panel B shows that the output share of HMT firms increases by 
around 4–7 percentage points at the dialect borders.  
Table 1.3 displays the heterogeneous effects of common dialects by industry. Panel A 
shows the effects by FDI regulation, and Panel B shows the effects by the productivity of HMT 
firms. The models are estimated at the firm level using equations (1.5) and (1.6). The dependent 
variable is a firm’s HMT equity share. I report the coefficients on the dummy variable indicating 
                                                          
28 The Akaike information criterion reported in the table strictly prefers the local linear model, which more 
efficiently estimates the discontinuous gap at the dialect borders. 
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common dialect (𝛿1 and 𝜌1) as well as the coefficients on the interaction terms (𝛿2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌2). As 
in Table 1.2, Columns (1) to (4) represent separate estimations with the first- to fourth-degree 
polynomials of distance to the dialect borders as control variables. Column (5) is estimated using 
a local linear model with a bandwidth of 30 km.  
  Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that the discontinuous increase in HMT equity share at the 
dialect borders is smaller when the entry cost of HMT firms, approximated by entry regulation, 
is higher. First, the coefficients on the common dialect dummy variable are generally positive, 
indicating that common dialects discontinuously increase the HMT equity share of industries that 
are not subject to entry regulation. Second, the coefficients on the interaction term between the 
common dialect dummy variable and the entry-regulation dummy variable are negative, 
indicating that the HMT equity share does not increase as much at the borders when the entry 
cost is higher due to the entry-regulation policy.  
 Panel B of Table 1.3 shows that the discontinuous increase in HMT equity share at the 
dialect borders is larger in industries in which HMT firms have productivity advantage. This 
finding is supported by the positive and statistically significant coefficients on the interaction 
term between common dialect and HMT firms’ industry-level productivity. When HMT firms 
have an advantage in specific industries, they are more likely to enter those industries and 
therefore produce a larger discontinuous increase across the dialect borders. 
With the discontinuous increase in the share of HMT firms across the dialect borders well 
established, I use this discontinuous increase in HMT investments as the exogenous variation to 
identify spillovers to domestic firms.  
Before showing the results from the full model with instruments, I first estimate the 
reduced-form model, which captures the direct effects of common dialects on domestic firms’ 
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productivity across the dialect borders. The models are estimated at the firm level using equation 
(1.10) with the TFP of domestic firms as the dependent variable. Since knowledge spillovers 
only happen when HMT firms have an advantage in productivity over domestic firms, I 
categorize industries based on the productivity of HMT firms relative to domestic firms29 and 
estimate the model separately for the two groups of industries. Table 1.4 shows the estimation 
results. As expected, Columns (3) and (4) show that in industries in which HMT firms are more 
productive than domestic firms, common dialects increase the productivity of domestic firms at 
the dialect borders. In contrast, Columns (1) and (2) show that in industries in which HMT firms 
are less productive than domestic firms, domestic firms’ productivity is very similar across the 
dialect borders. These findings indicate that cultural ties increase the productivity of domestic 
firms, but only in industries in which HMT firms have a productivity advantage over domestic 
firms. Therefore, cultural ties are more likely to affect domestic firms’ productivity by attracting 
more investments from HMT rather than through the direct effects of different cultures.  
Combining the discontinuous increase in the share of HMT firms with the discontinuous 
increase in the productivity of domestic firms across the dialect borders, I estimate the magnitude 
of horizontal spillovers using equation (1.11).30 In this specification, the discontinuous increase 
in the share of HMT firms at the dialect borders is used to instrument for the presence of HMT 
firms. Since the local linear model in Table 1.2 demonstrates the greatest statistical power to 
identify the discontinuous increase at the dialect borders, I use this model as the first stage to 
avoid potential problems of weak instruments. Columns (1) and (2) use a sample of all domestic 
                                                          
29 Using the sample of firms from all over China, I calculate the average productivity of HMT and domestic firms 
for each two-digit industry and then categorize industries according to whether HMT or domestic firms are more 
productive. 
30 We can also estimate the spillovers on other foreign firms. However, the sample size for other firms is too small to 
get a reliable estimator. 
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firms within 30 km of the dialect borders. Columns (3) and (4) use a sample of domestic firms 
from industries in which the productivity of HMT firms is higher than domestic firms.  In 
Columns (1) and (3), I use TFP estimated following Brandt et al. (2012) as the dependent 
variable, while in Columns (2) and (4), I use TFP estimated non-parametrically following 
Ackerberg et al. (2015). All models also include the following control variables: the output share 
of other foreign firms, age of the firms, log of total output, labor–capital ratio and log of total 
exports; the main results do not change significantly with the inclusion of these additional 
control variables.  
In Table 1.5, the horizontal spillover coefficients 𝜎1 in equation (1.11) are estimated to be 
positive in all models but are only statistically significant in the sample of domestic firms from 
industries in which HMT firms are more productive than domestic firms. In industries in which 
HMT firms have an advantage in productivity over domestic firms, we find positive local 
horizontal spillovers: a 1-percentage-point increase in the share of HMT firms raises the 
productivity of domestic firms in the same zip code and industry by 1.7 (estimated following 
Ackerberg et al. [2015]) to 2.8 (estimated following Brandt et al. [2012]) percent. The spillovers 
are not statistically significant in the whole sample, because there are no productivity spillovers 
in industries in which the productivity of HMT firms is lower than domestic firms. 
 The identification strategy employed in this study significantly affects the empirical 
estimates of the horizontal spillovers. Table 1.6 shows that if the models in Table 1.5 are 
estimated without using instruments, the coefficients on horizontal spillovers are negative in 
most specifications. This negative correlation can be driven by the selective entry of HMT firms 
into industries in which the productivity of domestic firms is low. I only identify the spillovers as 
positive after correcting for the endogenous entry problem using instruments. 
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The horizontal spillovers estimated in this study are much larger in magnitude than 
previous studies that do not address the endogenous entry problem of FDI. However, the 
magnitude of effects I find here is in line with the local horizontal spillovers estimated in Lu et 
al. (2017) (6.644), in which the authors use changes in regulation policy to identify the causal 
effect of FDI on domestic firms’ productivity. My estimates strengthen the argument that the 
OLS estimates tend to be biased, and therefore that a proper identification strategy is needed in 
order to estimate the spillovers from FDI.  
Industrial variation in regulation policies interacted with spatial discontinuity in dialects 
makes it possible to also estimate vertical spillovers (to domestic suppliers and buyers). In the 
full model with both horizontal and vertical spillovers estimated, vertical spillovers are not 
precisely estimated (negative but statistically insignificant) due to very weak first-stage results 
(see Appendix A6). 
 
1.5.3 Mechanisms of the positive horizontal spillovers 
This section discusses possible mechanisms that are driving the positive horizontal spillovers 
from HMT investments to domestic firms. The horizontal spillovers estimated in this study seem 
to be inconsistent with the average results from the meta-analysis conducted by Irsova and 
Havranek (2013), which concludes that horizontal spillovers are, on average, zero. However, the 
authors also indicate that “the sign and magnitude of spillovers depend systematically on the 
characteristics of domestic economy and foreign investors.” Therefore, the sign of spillovers 
seems to be quite sensitive to the economic context, and two mechanisms – namely cultural 




 First, when the source country of FDI has a similar culture as the host country, domestic 
firms are likely to adopt foreign technology more easily (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). This 
argument applies perfectly to this study, where the host regions are culturally very similar to 
HMT. Common culture serves as a mediating factor, which can reduce the cost of knowledge 
spillovers. Thus, firms in regions that are culturally similar to HMT are more likely to benefit 
from HMT investments. 
 Second, since I estimate local spillovers within a very small area, it is not surprising that 
my results are very different from national spillovers estimated in the literature. Previous studies 
have shown that distance matters when estimating horizontal spillovers. For example, Halpern 
and Murakozy (2007) found no evidence of horizontal spillovers at the country level, but after 
taking distance into account they found positive horizontal spillovers to domestic firms that are 
close to foreign firms. Xu and Sheng (2012) and Lu et al. (2017) also found that horizontal 
spillovers in China change from negative to positive if the analysis is restricted from the national 
level to the regional level. The authors argue that positive horizontal spillovers work through 
knowledge spillovers and labor pooling, which are more likely to occur when domestic firms are 
located close to foreign firms. In contrast, negative horizontal spillovers are usually caused by 
competition in the product market, which is more integrated at the national level. 
 Another concern is that investments from HMT could have crowded out less productive 
domestic firms from the same industry. Thus, the remaining domestic firms could be relatively 
more productive (Kosova, 2010).  If the crowding-out hypothesis were true, we should observe 
that domestic firms from the common dialect side of the border exhibit a smaller left tail of the 
productivity distribution and a lower age relative to firms from the non-common dialect side. 
However, we do not. Table 1.7 shows that the left-tail distribution and the age of domestic firms 
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are very similar across the dialect borders, indicating that the rise in the productivity of domestic 
firms is driven by the increase in the productivity of existing firms rather than by the crowding 
out of less productive domestic firms. 
 
1.5.4 Additional Tests 
To demonstrate the validity of the identification assumptions specified in Section 1.4.4, I conduct 
several additional tests. First, I show that observable non-economic covariates, such as 
demographic and geographic characteristics, change continuously at the dialect borders. Second, 
I show that investments from foreign countries other than HMT do not change discontinuously at 
the borders. Third, I find that investments from HMT do not change discontinuously at unrelated 
dialect borders. Fourth, investments from HMT do not change discontinuously when the actual 
dialect borders are arbitrarily moved. Fifth, the productivity of domestic firms from industries 
without investments from HMT is similar across the dialect borders. The evidence therefore 
jointly supports the main identification assumptions of this study. 
 Figure 1.9 shows the distribution of demographic and geographic characteristics of zip 
codes across the dialect borders.31 Figure 1.9.1 (a) shows that the total populations are similar 
across the dialect borders. Therefore, zip codes inside the borders do not contain more population 
centers than those outside the borders. Figures 1.9.1 (b) and 1.9.1 (c) jointly show that the ages 
of the populations are balanced across the dialect borders. Figure 1.9.1 (d) shows that the 
proportion of local people is similar across the borders, indicating that zip codes inside the 
borders do not attract more in-migrant workers than those outside the borders. Finally, Figures 
                                                          
31 The geographic distribution of average temperature and precipitation are shown in Appendix A13, even though 
the data on temperature and precipitation are not as detailed as other variables. 
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1.9.2 (e) and 1.9.2 (f) jointly show that the geographic conditions that may affect firms’ 
productivity, such as elevation and slope, are balanced across the dialect borders.32 
 Table 1.8 shows the effects of the dialect borders on investments from other foreign 
countries. I report the estimation results of equations (1.3) and (1.4) with the share of other 
foreign firms as the dependent variables. Model specifications are the same as in Table 1.2. As 
expected, I do not find statistically significant discontinuity at the dialect borders for most of the 
models. The magnitude of the coefficients is also very close to zero. Thus, I can claim that 
regions inside the dialect border do not generally attract more FDI: they only attract more FDI 
from HMT. 
Table 1.9 shows the effects of an alternative dialect border, which is unrelated to Min and 
Cantonese culture, on HMT investment. This exercise shows that the language borders 
themselves do not generate any effects on investment from HMT. Table 1.9 shows the estimation 
results of equation (1.3) and (1.4) with the dialect border specified as the Wu dialect border 
(location shown in Figure 1.11).33 In most model specifications, the Wu dialect border generates 
no statistically significant effect on investments from HMT. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
are close to zero and much smaller than those reported in Table 1.2.  
Tables 1.10 and 1.11 report the results of creating hypothetical placebo dialect borders by 
moving the actual dialect borders outward or inward by 100 km. Table 1.10 replicates the results 
of Table 1.2 by estimating equations (1.3) and (1.4) using the placebo dialect borders. As 
expected, none of these hypothetical dialect borders generates any discontinuous changes in the 
employment share of firms from HMT. The estimated discontinuous increase in the share of 
                                                          
 




HMT firms at the placebo dialect borders is statistically insignificant and very small in 
magnitude. Table 11 estimates the discontinuous changes in the TFP of domestic firms at the 
placebo dialect borders. I estimate equation (1.10) with the TFP of domestic firms as the 
dependent variables. Similar to the results from Table 9, none of the placebo dialect borders 
generates statistically significant discontinuous changes in domestic firms’ TFP. Nor is the 
discontinuous increase in domestic firms’ TFP higher in industries with more productive HMT 
firms. These results suggest that investments from HMT and the TFP of domestic firms change 
continuously as we move away from the dialect borders. 
 Finally, Table 1.12 supports the assumption that domestic firms’ productivity would be 
similar across the dialect borders without investment from HMT. To investigate this hypothetical 
question, I estimate the direct effect of common dialect borders on TFP using a sample of 
domestic firms from industries that receive the least investments from HMT. I report the 
coefficients on the common dialect dummy variable in the table. I find that when the share of 
HMT firms in an industry is 0 percent, the difference in TFP across the dialect borders is very 
close to zero. Therefore, the productivity of domestic firms should have been similar across the 
borders if there were no investment from HMT.  As the share of HMT firms increases from 0 to 
4 percentage points, there is a gradual increase in the productivity gap across the dialect borders. 
Yet the difference in TFP is still too small to be statistically distinguished from zero.  
 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this study, I show that unique cultural ties increase investments from HMT to Mainland 
China. Then, I use the discontinuous increase in HMT investments to show that foreign 
investments from HMT to Mainland China generate positive local horizontal spillovers that raise 
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the productivity of domestic firms in industries in which HMT firms are more productive than 
domestic firms. The causal effect is identified by exploring discontinuous changes in HMT 
investments at the borders of Chinese dialect zones.  My empirical estimates show that the 
horizontal spillovers identified in previous studies might have been wrongly estimated in sign or 
significantly underestimated in magnitude. Due to potential endogeneity concerns, better 
empirical designs are required to estimate spillovers generated by FDI to domestic firms. 
This study finds that spillovers are larger in magnitude when foreign firms are culturally 
similar to domestic firms. This finding implies that policy makers should not only design policies 
to attract FDI, but should also consider matching foreign firms with domestic firms that are 
similar in certain aspects (for example culture) so that domestic firms can benefit more from the 
spillovers from foreign firms. 
 One major limitation of this study is external validity. The identification strategy only 
allows the estimation of spillovers from HMT firms. However, such spillovers may be 
systematically different from those generated by other foreign firms, as shown by Lin et al. 
(2009) and Du et al. (2012). Both studies find that non-HMT foreign firms (primarily from 
OECD countries) generate positive spillovers, yet HMT firms generate negative (close to zero) 
spillovers in China. The difference between HMT and non-HMT firms could be caused by 
biased estimates due to endogeneity concerns. However, I am not able to conclude that the 
unbiased spillovers from HMT firms are also different from non-HMT firms, because my 
identification strategy does not allow the estimation of non-HMT firms. Therefore, I recommend 
caution when trying to generalize the results of this study to investments from other foreign 
countries.  Also, in this study, the destination location is culturally very similar to the source 
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region of FDI, which may drive the positive spillovers. Therefore, the results may not apply to 
situations in which the destination location is not similar to the source region.   
 In this study, I mainly focus on analyzing horizontal spillovers from HMT investments. 
However, Melitz and Toubal (2014) show that spillovers are more likely to occur across 
industries, especially to suppliers of foreign firms. Spillovers across industries are unlikely to be 
precisely identified from the empirical setting of this study, because I rely on regional variation 
(across the dialect border) in HMT investments to identify spillovers. It is unlikely that suppliers 
and buyers of a specific firm are restricted to the area where the firm is located.34 Also, in my 
sample many zip codes specialize in certain industries. Therefore, I do not observe enough cases 
of spillovers to other industries in the same geographic location. Thus, unable to precisely 
identify vertical spillovers is an important limitation of this strategy.  
 Finally, investments from HMT can generate spillovers to domestic firms across the 
dialect borders. As a result, domestic firms from zip codes that do not speak the same dialect as 
HMT, which are the control group of this study, might also be affected by spillovers to some 
degree. Thus, this study may underestimate and calculate a lower bound of the true effect of 







                                                          
34 The results of vertical spillovers are shown in Appendix A6. 
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1.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
  
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics    
Variables Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Panel A: Zip-code-level variables (Bandwidth: 40km): 
Common dialect 9456 0.62 0.48 
Employment share of HMT firms 9456 0.26 0.35 
Output share of HMT firms 9456 0.25 0.34 
Employment share of other foreign firms 9456 0.09 0.20 
Output share of other foreign firms 9456 0.10 0.22 
Distance to dialect borders (km, absolute 
value)  
9456 20.73 11.00 
Panel B: Firm-level variables (All firms): 
Common dialect 77531 0.68 0.47 
FDI regulation 77531 0.33 0.47 
HMT equity share 77531 0.27 0.43 
Panel C: Firm-level variables (Domestic firms): 
Ln(TFP) 33589 0.08 1.04 
Ln(TFP) (Non-parametric) 33589 -0.01 0.87 
Output share of HMT firms in the same 
industry and location 
33589 0.08 0.19 
Note: This Table shows the summary statistics of major variables. HMT refers to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
Panel A shows variables used in zip-code-level analysis. Panel B shows variables used in Firm-level analysis. 
Panel C shows variables used in the estimation of spillovers of domestic firms. The sampling bandwidth of Panel A 




Table 1.2: The Effects of Common Dialect on the Share of Firms from Hong Kong, Macau, 
and Taiwan (HMT) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local linear 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Employment share 
Common Dialect 0.055*** 0.075** 0.048 0.067 0.070*** 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.047) (0.063) (0.024) 
Optimal 
    Bandwidth 
    30 
 
AIC 733 725 727 726 42 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Output share 
Common Dialect 0.046** 0.056* 0.065 0.044 0.054** 
 (0.022) (0.034) (0.050) (0.065) (0.024) 
Optimal     
    Bandwidth 
    30 
AIC 1164 1160 1163 1164 350 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, distance to Hong Kong or 
Taipei 
Observations 9456 9456 9456 9456 7067 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on 
the share of HMT firms. Models are estimated following the spatial regression discontinuity design using a 
sample of zip codes within 40 kilometers of the dialect borders. The dependent variable is the total employment 
(output) of HMT firms over total employment (output) of all firms for each zip code. The coefficients that 
capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome variables at the common dialect borders are shown in the 
table. Column (1) to column (4) estimate model (3) by controlling the first to fourth degree polynomials of 
distance to the dialect borders respectively. Column (5) estimate a local linear model with optimal bandwidth 
chosen using cross-validation. Panel A uses the employment share as the dependent variable. Panel B uses the 





Table 1.3: Heterogeneous Effects of Common Dialect on the Share of HMT Firms by Industry 
(FDI Regulation and Productivity of HMT firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local linear 
Dependent Variable:  HMT equity share 
Panel A: By whether the industry is under FDI entry-regulation 
Common Dialect  0.065* 0.085 0.56 0.057 0.095** 
 (0.036) (0.054) (0.074) (0.075) (0.039) 
Common Dialect*FDI 
    Regulation  
-0.053* -0.054* -0.055* -0.055* -0.036 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) 
Bandwidth 
Observations 
    30 
58060 77537 77537 77537 77537 
Panel B: By the productivity of HMT firms for each industry 
Common Dialect 0.12*** 0.13** 0.12 0.13 0.18*** 
 (0.049) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
Common Dialect*Produ 
    -ctivity of HMT firms 
0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.40*** 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Bandwidth     30 
Observations 77466 77466 77466 77466 58000 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, 
distance to Hong Kong or Taipei 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on the share of 
HMT firms in different industries. Panel A compares the effects in industries under FDI entry-regulation with 
industries not under regulation. Panel B compares the effects in industries where the productivity of HMT firms is 
high with industries where the productivity of HMT firms is low.  All models are estimated following spatial 
regression discontinuity design using a sample of firms within 40 kilometers of the dialect borders [model (5) and 
model (6)]. The dependent variable is HMT equity share for each firm. Column (1) to column (4) estimate the 
models by controlling the first to fourth degree polynomials of distance to the dialect borders respectively. Column 
(5) estimate a local linear model with bandwidth chosen to be 30 km. In panel A, I report the coefficients on the 
common dialect dummy variable and the coefficients on the interaction between common dialect and whether the 
industry is under FDI regulation. Similarly, in panel B, I report the coefficients on the common dialect dummy 




Table 1.4: The Effects of Common Dialect on the Productivity of Domestic Firms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
HMT firms less productive than 
domestic firms 
HMT firms more productive 







Common dialect -0.061 -0.027 0.26*** 0.12** 
 (0.076) (0.054) (0.079) (0.054) 
Observations 11580 11580 22009 22009 
Control variables 
County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, distance to 
Hong Kong or Taipei, the share of other foreign firms in the same zip 
code and industry, Age of the firm, capital-labor ratio, log(output), 
log(export) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on the 
productivity of domestic firms by industries. Industries are categorized by whether an average HMT firm from 
the industry is more productive than an average domestic firm from the industry. All models estimate the 
discontinuous changes in the TFP of domestic firms at the common dialect borders using spatial regression 
discontinuity design at the firm level. The coefficients that capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome 
variables at the common dialect borders are shown in the table. All models use a sample of all domestic firms 
within 30 km of the common dialect borders. Column (1) and (2) use a sample of domestic firms from industries 
where the productivity of HMT firms is lower than domestic firms. Column (3) and (4) use a sample of domestic 
firms from industries where the productivity of HMT firms is higher than domestic firms. Column (1) and (3) use 
TFP calculated following the framework of Brandt et al. (2012). Column (2) and (4) use an alternative measure of 














Table 1.5: Horizontal Spillovers from HMT Firms to Domestic Firms (GMM IV Estimation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 








Panel A: Second Stage:     
Horizontal Spillovers 1.62 1.15 2.78** 1.69** 
 (1.59) (1.20) (1.28) (0.86) 
Panel B: First Stage:     
Common Dialect  0.051* 0.051* 0.091*** 0.091*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) 
Observations 33589 33589 22009 22009 
Control variables 
County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, 
distance to Hong Kong or Taipei, the share of other foreign firms 
in the same zip code and industry, Firms’ age, capital-labor ratio, 
log(output), log(export). 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the horizontal spillovers from HMT 
investment to domestic firms in the same zip code and industry. Column (1) and (2) use a sample of all 
domestic firms within 30 km of the dialect borders. Column (3) and (4) use a sample of domestic firms from 
industries where the productivity of HMT firms is higher than domestic firms. All models are estimated using 
two stage GMM IV method, where the share of HMT firms is instrumented by the common dialect dummy 
variable in the spatial regression discontinuity design [model (9)]. The first stage is estimated using the local 
linear version of the spatial regression discontinuity design with bandwidth chosen to be 30 km. The 
coefficients on the common dialect dummy variable in the first stage are shown in panel 2 of the table. In panel 
1, I report the coefficients from the second stage on the share of HMT firms in the same industry and zip code, 
which is interpreted as horizontal spillovers. Column (1) and (3) use TFP calculated following the framework 
of Brandt et al. (2012). Column (2) and (4) use an alternative measure of TFP calculated using non-parametric 
method following Ackerberg et al. (2015) as the dependent variables.   
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Table 1.6: Horizontal Spillovers Estimated without Instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Firms 









Horizontal Spillover -0.086 -0.065* -0.12 -0.10* 
 (0.058) (0.039) (0.074) (0.052) 
Observations 33589 33589 22009 22009 
Control variables 
County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, 
distance to Hong Kong or Taipei, Firms’ years in business, capital-
labor ratio, log(output), whether exporter. 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the horizontal spillovers to domestic firms 
estimated without using the identification strategy at the dialect borders. Column (1) and (2) use a sample of all 
domestic firms within 30 km of the dialect borders. Column (3) and (4) use a sample of domestic firms from 
industries where the productivity of HMT firms is higher than domestic firms. Column (1) and (3) use TFP 
calculated following the framework of Brandt et al. (2012) as the dependent variable. Column (2) and (4) use TFP 






Table 1.7: The Effects of Common Dialect on the Distribution of the Productivity of Domestic 
Firms (Testing the crowding-out effect) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Age of the Firm 
Standard Deviation of the 
Distribution 
Size of the Tail 
(Median-5% Quantile) 
Common dialect 2.65 0.060 0.12 
 (3.00) (0.045) (0.10) 
Observations 22009 22009 22009 
Control variables 
County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, distance to 
Hong Kong or Taipei 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on the age and 
the distribution of the productivity of domestic firms. All models estimate the discontinuous changes in the TFP 
of domestic firms at the common dialect borders using spatial regression discontinuity design at the firm level. 
All models use a sample of domestic firms from industries where the average productivity of HMT firms is higher 
than average domestic firms.The coefficients that capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome variables at 
the common dialect borders are shown in the table. All models use a sample of all domestic firms within 30 km of 
the common dialect borders. The distribution of productivity is based on the TFP calculated following the 
framework of Brandt et al. (2012). The results are similar if I use the distribution of productivity calculated based 










Table 1.8: The Effects of Common Dialect on the Share of Other Foreign Firms  
(Additional Tests) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local linear 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Employment share: 
Common Dialect 0.001 -0.01 -0.037 0.015 0.0003 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.027) (0.034) (0.016) 
Optimal Bandwidth     30 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Output share: 
Common Dialect 0.0004 0.0006 -0.078** -0.025 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.031) (0.040) (0.017) 
Optimal Bandwidth     30 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, distance to Hong Kong or Taipei 
Observations 9456 9456 9456 9456 7067 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of Common Dialect on 
the share of other foreign firms, which serves as a falsification test. Column (1) to column (4) estimate the model 
of spatial regression discontinuity design [model (3)] by controlling the first to fourth degree polynomials of 
distance to the dialect borders respectively. Column (5) estimate a local linear model with optimal bandwidth 
chosen to be 30 km. The coefficients that capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome variables at the 
common dialect borders are shown in the table. Panel A uses the employment share of other foreign firms as the 




Table 1.9: The Effects of Wu Dialect Border (placebo dialect border) on the Share of HMT 
Firms (Additional Tests) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local linear 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Employment share 
Common Dialect -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0038 -0.0030 -0.0010 
 (0.0081) (0.012) (0.0015) (0.019) (0.0091) 
Bandwidth     30 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Output share 
Common Dialect 0.0084 0.0093 0.018 0.0043 0.0083 
 (0.0078) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.0089) 
Bandwidth     30 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, distance to Shanghai  
Observations 10127 10127 10127 10127 7902 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of Wu dialect border on the 
share of HMT firms. Because Wu culture is not related to Hong Kong or Taiwan culture, I expect to observe no 
discontinuous changes in HMT investment at the Wu dialect border.  Column (1) to column (4) estimate the 
model of spatial regression discontinuity design [model (3)] by controlling the first to fourth degree polynomials 
of distance to the dialect borders respectively. Column (5) estimate a local linear model with bandwidth chosen 
to be 30 km. The coefficients that capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome variables at the common 
dialect borders are shown in the table. Panel A uses the employment share of HMT firms as the dependent 










Table 1.10: The Effects of Hypothetical Placebo Dialect Borders on the Employment Share of 
Firms from HMT (Additional Tests) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local linear 
Panel A: Moving the actual dialect border out by 100km 
Common Dialect 0.0065 -0.021 -0.044 -0.032 -0.0043 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.037) (0.047) (0.028) 
Bandwidth 
Observations 
    30 
2722 3444 3444 3444 3444 
Panel B:  Moving the actual dialect border in by 100km 
Common Dialect -0.0011 -0.034 -0.011 -0.014 0.0061 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.064) (0.083) (0.045) 
Bandwidth 
Observations 
    30 
2160 3004 3004 3004 3004 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, distance to Hong Kong or 
Taipei 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of hypothetical 
placebo dialect borders on the employment share of HMT firms. Panel A moves the actual dialect borders 
outward by 100km. Panel B moves the actual dialect borders inward by 100km. Column (1) to column (4) 
estimate the model of spatial regression discontinuity design [model (3)] by controlling the first to fourth degree 
polynomials of distance to the dialect borders respectively. Column (5) estimate a local linear model with 
bandwidth chosen to be 30 km. The coefficients that capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome variables 
at the common dialect borders are shown in the table. Panel A uses employment share of HMT firms as the 








Table 1.11: The Effects of Hypothetical Placebo Dialect Borders on the Productivity of 
Domestic Firms (Additional Tests) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All firms HMT firms more productive 







Panel A: Moving the actual dialect border out by 100km 
Common dialect 0.092 0.091 0.062 0.059 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.083) 
Observations 20296 20296 9129 9129 
Panel B:  Moving the actual dialect border in by 100km 
Common dialect 0.008 -0.029 0.058 -0.027 
 (0.071) (0.054) (0.11) (0.074) 
Observations 34305 34305 15201 15201 
Control 
variables 
County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, distance to 
Hong Kong or Taipei, the share of other foreign firms in the same zip code 
and industry, Age of the firm, capital-labor ratio, log(output), log(export) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of hypothetical 
placebo dialect borders on the productivity of domestic firms. All models estimate the discontinuous changes in 
the TFP of domestic firms at the hypothetical dialect borders using spatial regression discontinuity design at the 
firm level. The coefficients that capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome variables at the hypothetical 
dialect borders are shown in the table. Panel A moves the actual dialect borders outward by 100km. Panel B 
moves the actual dialect borders inward by 100km. Column (1) and (2) use a sample of all domestic firms within 
30 km of the hypothetical dialect borders. Column (3) and (4) use a sample of domestic firms from industries 
where the productivity of HMT firms is higher than domestic firms. Column (1) and (3) use TFP calculated 
following the framework of Brandt et al. (2012). Column (2) and (4) use an alternative measure of TFP calculated 






Table 1.12: The Effects of Common Dialect on the Productivity of Domestic Firms from 
Industries with Low HMT Investment (Additional Tests) 











Dependent Variable: ln(TFP) 










Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, distance to 
Hong Kong or Taipei, Firms ‘age, ln(output), capital-labor ratio, 
ln(export). 
Observations 27447 28414 28828 29412 30005 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common 
dialect on the productivity of domestic firms from industries with low HMT investment. All models estimate 
discontinuous changes in the TFP of domestic firms at the common dialect borders using spatial regression 
discontinuity design at the firm level. The coefficients that capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome 
variables at the common dialect borders are shown in the table. All models use a sample of all domestic firms 
within 30 km of the common dialect borders. Column (1) to column (5) show the results on industries with 




Figure 1.1 : The Cantonese Dialect Zone and the Min Dialect Zone 
 
Notes: This figure shows the geographical location of the two dialect zones investigated in this study: the Cantonese 




Figure 1.2: The Share of Investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
 
Notes: This figure shows the share of Hong Kong and Taiwan investment to mainland China among all foreign 
investments. Dashed line indicates the share of Hong Kong investment while solid line indicates the share of Tai 





Figure 1.3: An Example of a Dialect Border  
 
Notes: This figure shows an example of how dialect border is constructed from knowledge on major dialect used by 
villages of China. Different notations on the map indicates different types of dialects. For example, the white section 
denotes Chengyao pian and the vertical dashed line indicates Chengxi pian. (The example county is not in 





Figure 1.4: Dialect Borders and Administrative County Borders 
 
Notes: This figure shows an example of the relationship between dialect borders and county level administrative 
borders. The solid black line denotes the Cantonese dialect border. The shallow grey lines denote administrative 
county borders. The points refer to the centroids of zip codes. We can see that an administrative county could be 





Figure 1.5: The Geographical Distribution of the Share of Representative Surnames 
1.5.1 Min dialect border 
 
1.5.2 Cantonese (Yue) dialect border 
 
Notes: This figure shows the discontinuous changes in the population share of representative surnames at the dialect 
borders. Figure 1.5.1 shows the population share of representative surnames (3 most common surnames) for the Min 
cultural group (Chen [陈], Lin [林] and Huang [黄]) at the border of Min dialect zone. Figure 1.5.2 shows the 
population share of representative surnames for the Cantonese cultural group (Chen [陈], Liang [梁] and Li [李]) at 
the border of Cantonese dialect zone. Horizontal axis shows the distance to dialect borders with negative value 
indicating inside the borders. Vertical axis shows average population share of representative surnames for each 





Figure 1.6: Discontinuity in the Share of HMT Firms at the Borders of the Dialect Zones 
 
Notes: This figure shows the employment share of HMT firms among all firms by distance to the dialect borders. 
All zip codes within 30 kilometers are included in the analysis. The horizontal axis denotes distance to the dialect 
borders with negative value indicating the zip code is located inside the border (the same dialect as HMT). The 
vertical axis denotes the average share of HMT firms (total employment of HMT firms over total employment of all 






Figure 1.7: Discontinuity in the Share of HMT Firms at the Borders of the Dialect Zones 
(Standardization at the county level) 
1.7.1. Employment Share 
 
1.7.2. Output Share 
 
Notes: These figures show the share of HMT firms among all firms by distance to the dialect borders. All zip codes 
within 30 kilometers are included in the analysis. The horizontal axis denotes distance to the dialect borders with 
negative value indicating that the zip code is located inside the border (same dialect as HMT). The vertical axis 
denotes the average share of HMT firms for a given distance. Figure 1.7.1 shows the distribution of employment 
share; Figure 1.7.2 shows the distribution of output share. The share of HMT firms is standardized at the county 





Figure 1.8: Discontinuity in the Share of HMT firms at the Borders of the Dialect Zones 
(Non-linear) 
1.8.1. Employment Share 
 
1.8.2 Output Share 
 
Notes: These figures show the share of HMT firms among all firms by distance to the dialect borders. All zip codes 
within 40 kilometers are included in the analysis. The horizontal axis denotes the distance to the dialect borders with 
negative value indicating that the zip code is located inside the border (same dialect as HMT). The vertical axis 
denotes the average share of HMT firms for a given distance. The model is fitted using the fourth-degree 
polynomials of distance to the borders. Figure 1.8.1 shows the distribution of employment share; Figure 1.8.2 shows 
the distribution output share. The share of HMT firms is standardized at the county level by subtracting county mean 




Figure 1.9: The Geographical Distribution of Demographic and Geographic Variables 
across the Dialect Borders (Additional Tests) 
1.9.1 Demographic Variables 
 
                                  (a) Population                                    (b) Share of young people 
 





1.9.2 Geographical Variables 
 
                                  (e) Elevation                                                   (f) Slope 
Notes: These figures show the geographical distribution of demographic and geographic variables by distance to the 
dialect borders. All zip codes within 40 kilometers are included in the analysis. The horizontal axis denotes distance 
to the dialect borders with negative value indicating the zip code is located inside the border (the same dialect as 
HMT). The vertical axis denotes outcome variables: (a) logarithm of total population; (b) the share of people who 
are under 14 years old; (c) the share of people who are above 65 years old; (d) the share of people who have local 
hukou (is a local resident) (People who do not have local hukou but are included in the census are in-migrants); (e) 
elevation of the zip code; (f) slope of the zip code. All outcome variables are standardized at the county level by 
subtracting county mean and dividing by county standard deviation. Demographic data are from aggregated data of 





Figure 1.10: The Geographical Distribution of the Share of Foreign Firms from Other 
Countries at the Borders of the Dialect zones (Additional Tests) 
1.10.1 Employment Share 
 
1.10.2 Output Share 
 
Notes: These figures show the share of foreign firms from regions other than HMT among all firms by distance to 
the dialect borders. These figures serve as a falsification test. The horizontal axis denotes the distance to the dialect 
borders with negative value indicating the zip code is located inside the borders (same dialect as HMT). The vertical 
axis denotes the average share of other foreign firms for a given distance. Figure 1.10.1 shows the distribution of 
employment share; Figure 1.10.2 shows the distribution of output share. The share of other foreign firms is 





Figure 1.11: Illustration of the Placebo Dialect Border (Wu dialect border) 
 
Notes: This figure shows the geographical location of the placebo dialect border (Wu dialect border) relative to the 
Cantonese and Min dialect border. The common border between Wu and Min dialect zones is excluded from the 














CHAPTER 2: WHO CORESIDES WITH PARENTS? AN ANALYSIS BASED ON 
SIBLING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Coresidence between elderly parents and independent, married adult children is a common 
phenomenon in East Asian societies. For example, according to the 2005 China Inter-Census 
Survey data, two thirds of elderly people aged 65 and beyond live with their adult children (Zeng 
and Xie 2014). Similarly, high coresidence rates are also reported in Taiwan, Japan and South 
Korea (Kim 2010; Chu et al. 2011; Takagi and Silverstein 2011). Previous research has mainly 
studied whether elderly parents coreside with children or whether they live independently (Logan 
et al. 1998; Zhang 2004; Zimmer and Korinek 2010; Chu et al. 2011; Takagi and Silverstein 2011). 
What has been understudied in the literature is with which child parents coreside when the 
extended family has multiple adult children. We propose a new theoretical framework and present 
empirical evidence on how parents’ and children’s characteristics affect this decision- making 
process. 
Multigenerational coresidence in East Asian societies is not only a cultural tradition, but 
also a resource-sharing mechanism that responds to practical needs. Previous research identifies 
at least two main motives for coresidence. First, when young and healthy, parents could act as 
housework labor providers (care givers). For instance, they could look after their grandchildren 
(Lee and Bauer 2013; Chu et al. 2014; Zeng and Xie 2014). Second, when old and unhealthy, 
parents could also be housework labor receivers (care receivers). Coresidence enables children to 
provide old-age support for the parents (Logan et al. 1998; Zhang 2004; Zimmer and Korinek 




mentioned above to explain with which adult child elderly parents coreside. Following Becker 
(1981), we emphasize the opportunity cost of children’s housework labor35 and how it affects the 
division of labor within an extended family. When parents are housework labor providers, they 
can help children with housework. Thus, it is better for the welfare of the entire extended family 
to have the parents coreside with the child whose opportunity cost of housework labor is highest. 
When parents become housework receivers, they need help from children for housework. Then, it 
is better to have parents coreside with the child whose opportunity cost of housework labor is 
lowest. We use education of children as measure of opportunity cost of housework labor, because 
children’s education level largely correlates with their forgone labor market income. Thus, our 
theory yields two empirical implications that can be taken to the data: 1) young and healthy parents 
are more likely to coreside with relatively higher-educated children among siblings, and 2) old and 
unhealthy parents are more likely to coreside with relatively lower-educated children.  
We test our hypotheses by using the Mainland China sample from the Panel Study of 
Family Dynamics (PSFD). We focus on a sample of married adult children who have siblings and 
retirement aged parents (Number of children=4007; Number of families=971). We employ an 
extended-family fixed-effects model to test our hypotheses. The fixed-effects model reveals how 
characteristics of one child relative to siblings affect the choice of coresidence. We find our 
predictions are supported among families from rural areas36 (Number of children=3023; Number 
of families=714). In this subsample, the probability of coresiding with at least one of the parents 
is positively associated with relative education level of children when parents are young and 
healthy. When parents grow old or become unhealthy, the positive correlation decreases and finally 
                                                          
35 The opportunity cost of housework labor refers to the benefits people have to give up when they choose to do 
housework.  
36 The social origin of the extended family (rural or urban) is defined by the major residence of the respondent child 




becomes negative. However, our predictions are not supported in the urban subsample (Number 
of children=984; Number of families=257).  The lack of support from the urban sample is hardly 
surprising.  Individuals who live in cities could obtain external housework labor supply from the 
housework labor market. In other words, our theory is restricted to the setting where only the 
children provide housework labor.  
 While traditional cultural values still affect people’s decisions, existing literature on 
multigenerational coresidence in East Asia notes that, as the economy grows and modernizes, 
practical motives and resource constraints have started to play increasingly important roles. For 
example, Logan and Bian (1999) show that although parents still express traditional preferences, 
the actual living arrangement is usually different from ideal due to practical concerns; Chu and 
colleagues (2011) show that personal resources enable individuals to deviate from tradition; Sun 
(2002) shows that the level of children’s support for parents depends on elderly parents’ needs and 
children’s financial capacities; and Xie and Zhu (2009) find that, counter-intuitively, daughters 
rather than sons actually provide more support, which can be explained by daughters’ resources. 
We follow this strand of literature by focusing on one specific type of resource constraint: the 
opportunity cost of housework labor. Then we show how this constraint affects choices in 
coresidence within the extended family. 
 Our emphasis on practical motives and resource constraints does not imply that traditional 
cultural values, such as filial piety, no longer play a role in Chinese families. We believe culture 
is still an important factor in family decisions, but we try to “background” culture (Bachrach 2014) 
in our study because we do not offer any new cultural explanations for coresidence patterns. We 
treat cultural values as predetermined preferences of family members and then show how practical 




Empirically, we control for possible variables that reflect cultural value differences. Consistent 
with the existent literature, we find that some cultural factors are still powerful. For example, 
gender is still an important determinant of coresidence (Whyte 2004; Whyte and Xu 2003). There 
is a higher chance for parents to live with sons than daughters. Interestingly, we also find 
contradictions. For example, parents are not more likely to coreside with oldest sons in family 
fixed-effects models. This finding seems to be inconsistent with traditional Chinese family norms, 
but is actually in line with some previous empirical findings (e.g., Lin et al. 2003; Logan and Bian 
1999). The cultural belief that parents should coreside with oldest sons is thus not strong enough 
and is dominated by practical concerns. 
 Although our study is based on Chinese data, our theoretical framework does not contain 
any China-specific factors. Thus we believe that the theoretical framework is generalizable and 
could also be applied to other East Asian societies and even some Western societies. However, 
when applying this theoretical framework to Western societies, coresidence is not the appropriate 
outcome variable, because the rationale for parent-child coresidence in the West is different from 
Eastern societies. Parents who coreside with children in Western societies usually do so because 
children are not yet independent and thus need resource transfers from parents (Aquilino 1990; 
Leopold 2012). Moreover, coresidence is usually not related to old-age support (Ruggles 2011). 
Thus, instead of coresidence, our study is more closely related to the literature on children who 
provide old-age support in Western societies (Coward and Dwyer 1990; Shuey and Hardy 2003; 
Henz 2010; Lin and Wu 2014). For example, Silverstein and Giarrusso (2010) show that adult 
children are the most common source, after spouses, of family eldercare in 6 Western countries. 
How siblings divide the burden of parental care is an understudied area but has started to receive 




Schone 1999; Friedman and Seltzer 2010; Grigoryeva 2013). Daughters are found more likely to 
provide parental care than sons. We hope our opportunity-cost explanation will contribute to the 
knowledge about how division of labor among siblings is affected by a variety of variables besides 
gender. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second section discusses our theoretical 
framework and compares it with existing sociological theories; the third section discusses related 
background knowledge about Chinese families; the fourth section presents our data and empirical 
methodology; the penultimate section reports our empirical results and the last section discusses 
potential limitations of our research.   
 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Our theory directly follows Becker’s (1981) theoretical framework on the “division of labor” 
within family. This theoretical framework is widely used in demography, economics and sociology 
literatures (Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974; Gershuny and Robinson 1988; Brines 1994; 
Himmelweit et al. 2013). Yet, existing studies usually only focus on division of labor within a 
nuclear family (e.g. division of labor between husbands and wives). Our study attempts to extend 
the scope of this theory to an extended-family context and we also study division of labor among 
siblings. 
 We first employ the “unitary” approach, which assumes that the extended family makes 
decisions as if a family planner makes decisions to maximize the utility of all family members. 
Each child has exogenous labor endowment and they decide on how much labor should be used 
on labor market and how much on home production. Moreover, we assume that family members 




produced by home production. Thus, in the following sections of this paper, we simply use 
housework to represent all kinds of services that are the results of home production. Parents also 
have exogenous labor endowment and coresidence is defined as parents sharing labor endowment 
with the child they coreside with. Parents are housework providers if their labor endowment is 
high. They can help the child they coreside with to do housework. Then, the child who is helped 
by parents could work more in the labor market and earn more income for the family. Since a 
relatively higher-educated child has higher expected income from the labor market, the income 
gain for the family will be larger if parents help the higher-educated child.37 On the other hand, 
parents are housework receivers if their labor endowment is low. They need help from the child 
they coreside with. Then the child who is selected to help the parents would work less in the labor 
market and the family loses some income. Because relatively, a lower- educated child has lower 
expected income from the labor market, the loss for the family will be smaller if lower-educated 
child takes care of the parents. A utility-maximizing family planner will thus allocate parents to 
the highest-educated child among siblings when parents are housework providers and allocate 
parents to the lowest educated child when parents are housework receivers. This arrangement will 
create division of labor within an extended family such that higher-educated children specialize in 
labor market while lower-educated children specialize in housework. 
 The “unitary” model is simple and has clear empirical implications. However, in reality, 
family decision is a decentralized process where family members bargain with each other， which 
makes modeling family decision more complicated (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and 
Horney 1981; Pezzin and Schone 1999). As a compromise, Chiappori and colleagues (1988, 1992 
and 1998) develop the “collective model” of family, which assumes that bargaining makes 
                                                          
37 This conclusion relies on the assumption of income pooling. In other words, the marginal benefit from money does 




resource allocation within family “Pareto Efficient”38. In this research, we seek to show that under 
certain conditions the empirical implications drawn from the “unitary” model is “Pareto Efficient” 
and thus consistent with the “collective model” of family. Specifically, if coresidence pattern is 
different from the “unitary” model implications, it is always possible to increase the welfare of 
some family members without hurting the others. This result is based on one critical additional 
assumption: children could make monetary transfers to their siblings. We use an example to 
illustrate how the coresidence pattern predicted by the “unitary” model can actually be realized 
through decentralized bargaining among family members and how family members benefit from 
this coresidence pattern. First, we suppose parents are housework providers and they initially 
coreside with one of the children (child A). Coresidence gives this child benefit A1. Suppose there 
is another child (child B) who has higher education level than child A. Then child B’s opportunity 
cost of housework is higher than child A. Thus the benefit child B can obtain from coresidence, 
denoted as B1, will be larger than A1. Then child B could offer child A monetary transfer T1 (B1 > 
T1 > A1) to ask for the relocation of parents from child A to child B. This offer is acceptable for 
both child A and child B, because they get positive net benefits from the relocation (child A gets 
T1 - A1 > 0; child B gets B1 - T1 > 0). Thus Child A and Child B both benefit from the relocation 
and no other children will be harmed. If we assume children always accept beneficial offers (so 
the resulting resource allocation will be “Pareto Efficient“), then the result from the decentralized 
decision-making process will also be that the parents coreside with the highest-educated child 
among siblings. This is because the highest-educated child can always provide a transfer that is 
large enough to relocate the parent to him/herself. We can similarly derive the case where parents 
are housework receivers. In this case, coresiding with parents will incur cost to children and the 
                                                          
38 “Pareto efficiency” indicates resource allocation such that it is impossible to increase the welfare of some family 




cost is higher for higher-educated children. If parents initially coreside with a higher-educated 
child, the higher-educated child would like to pay a transfer to a lower-educated sibling and 
relocate parents. This relocation with transfer can also make both children better off. Thus, when 
parents are housework receivers, they will eventually coreside with the lowest-educated child.  
 In all versions of our theories, we implicitly maintain ceteris paribus assumptions. Children 
are assumed to only differ in the opportunity cost of housework labor (education) with other factors 
being the same. For example, housework demand is assumed to not differ significantly among 
siblings. It is straightforward to modify the model to incorporate other factors. Differences in 
housework demand could be modeled as differences in the marginal benefits of housework labor. 
The coresidence pattern will be thus jointly determined by marginal benefits of housework and 
marginal opportunity cost of housework labor. In our empirical specifications, we try to control 
for different characteristics of children to match the ceteris paribus theoretical assumptions. 
 The rational choice economic models we use to explain coresidence pattern share some 
common features with the sociology and demography models in the literature of multigenerational 
coresidence. The “unitary model” is closely associated with the “mutual aid model”, which treats 
family as a closely related network and seeks optimal distribution of resources within the family 
network (Lee et al. 1994; Sun 2002). The benefit of using the economic model is that we can 
clearly specify how optimal distribution of resources is achieved and thus make clear predictions. 
The “bargaining model” is similar to the “power and bargaining model” in Lee et al. (1994). The 
authors also mention that, “Siblings with more resources may include less well-off siblings to 
accept a trade of money for time by housing a parent.” In existing literature, the “power and 




our analysis shows that under certain conditions, the bargaining model can achieve outcomes that 
are beneficial to all family members.  
 To sum up, we restate our hypotheses formally as follows: 
   Hypothesis 1: When parents are housework providers (young and healthy), they are more 
likely to coreside with relatively higher-educated children. 
  Hypothesis 2: When parents are housework receivers (old and unhealthy), they are more 
likely to coreside with relatively lower-educated children. 
 
2.3 BACKGROUND 
Before proceeding to the Chinese data, this section briefly introduces some relevant background 
knowledge about the Chinese setting. 
 In order to study intergenerational relationships in China, we could not avoid discussing 
Chinese traditional culture. The whole country of China was under the influence of Confucian 
doctrines for thousands of years. The essence of Confucianism is to maintain patriarchal authority 
at both societal and family levels. “Filial piety” is regarded as the most important virtue for 
traditional Chinese people. Consequently, children, especially sons, bear the natural obligation to 
serve their elderly parents. This is usually realized through intergenerational coresidence in a 
traditional Chinese family, in which elderly parents are expected to live with their married children, 
especially the oldest son. However, as China has witnessed a series of crucial historical events and 
has gradually transformed into a modern country in the twentieth century, we have reasons to 
speculate deviations from Confucian family traditions in contemporary China, even though 




 Another important aspect related to elderly support and living arrangement in 
contemporary China is its huge rural-urban gap in economic development, living standard and 
lifestyle (Whyte 2010). The household registration system (hukou), established in 1955, divided 
the entire population into “agricultural” and “nonagricultural” sectors. While urban hukou holders 
have better access to jobs, education for children, housing and health care, rural hukou holders do 
not enjoy the same benefits (Wu and Treiman 2004). Such differential access to welfare leads to 
the situation where rural parents generally have lower financial security in comparison to their 
urban counterparts. As a result, they are supposed to be more dependent on their children when 
they get older. Besides less access to material goods, rural residents are also characterized as more 
relying on informal institutions, such as kin networks, rather than formal institutions like the 
market. For example the majority of farm households in rural China borrow money from friends 
and relatives rather than formal financial institutions (Turvey and Kong 2010).  
 
2.4 DATA AND METHODS 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use data from the mainland China sample of “Panel Study of 
Family Dynamics (PSFD)”. Taiwan Academia Sinica conducted this survey in 2004. The sample 
was drawn from Shanghai, Zhejiang and Fujian, using a stratified three-stage random sampling 
procedure. The respondent of the survey is one of the adult children of the extended family. The 
respondent is asked about his/her own characteristics, his/her parents’ characteristics and as many 
as 5 of his/her siblings’ characteristics. Then the respondent is asked whether he/she is coresiding 
with parents. If not, the respondent is asked which child the parents are coresiding with and that 




information on as many as seven children of the extended family as well as the parents.39 We can 
also make sure that the information on children who are coresiding with parents is included. 
Therefore, we believe that the data will meet our research purpose very well.  
 To construct our analytical sample, we reshape the data and make each child of the family 
as an observation. For example, if the respondent reports information on four of his/her siblings, 
we could obtain as many as five observations for that extended family in our analytical sample 
(four siblings and the respondent). Then, we match children’s information with the characteristics 
of their parents accordingly. Through this procedure, we acquire information on 14,088 children 
from 4,132 extended families. Then we restrict our sample to serve our analytical purposes. We 
keep observations according to the following criteria: (1) At least one parent is still alive (73.82% 
of the original sample kept). (2) The father is older than age 60 and the mother is older than age 
55 (61.65% of the original sample kept). This is because our model captures the choices of parents 
who do not work in the labor market. Because we do not directly observe whether parents are 
retired or not, we use 60 and 55, which are legal ages of retirement for male and female in China, 
to approximate retirement.40 (3) Parent(s) coresides with at least one of his/her children (32.51% 
of the original sample kept). (4) Families have at least two children (31.83% of the original sample 
kept).41 (5) We also exclude unmarried children and children younger than age 18 (28.44% of the 
original sample kept), because our theory only applies to independent adult children. Unmarried 
                                                          
39 For the majority of respondents, information on, at most, five siblings was collected. However, if the birth order of 
the parents-coresident sibling is larger than six, his or her information will be collected by a set of separate questions 
in the survey. If parents coreside with multiple children, the dummy dependent variable “coresidence with parents” 
will be coded as 1 for all coresident children.   
40 Some existing studies have pointed out that elderly parents may still do some work after retirement especially in 
rural China (Giles et al., 2011; Pang et al., 2004). Therefore we try to alter the age cutting points of parents so as to 
restrict the sample as one of the robustness checks and find out that our results are not sensitive to the age of parents 
we use to restrict our sample.  
41 The percentage of only-child families is very low in the original sample (7%), because most Chinese adults in a 




children42 and younger children, on the other hand, may coreside with parents due to financial or 
social dependence. Focusing only on married children is a strategy used by many coresidence 
studies on East Asian societies (Lee et al. 1994; Logan and Bian 1999; Chu et al. 2011; Chu et al. 
2014). Our empirical analysis produces comparable results to these studies. In the end, we 
construct an analytical sample of 4,007 children from 971 extended households, which is 
approximately 28.44% of the reshaped sample and 38.53% of the sample with at least one parent 
still alive43.  
 We use an extended household fixed-effects logistic regression model / conditional logit 
model (McFadden 1974; Woodridge 2001) to test the two main hypotheses44. The fixed-effects 
model makes it possible to conduct within-family comparisons. All extended family specific 
characteristics such as the average education level and cultural ideology of the family, will not 
affect our estimation. Thus, we are able to explore how differences among children within the 
same family affect with which child parents coreside.  
 Our empirical model is presented as follows: 
 The value (utility) extended-family j gets from letting parents coreside with the ith child is 
modeled as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗
′  𝛽 + 𝑖𝑗; 
                                                          
42 Because divorce is extremely rare in the sample (only 2.37% respondents in the original data report their marital 
status as divorce), unmarried children mainly refer to children before their first marriage.  
43 The procedure of restricting the sample is unlikely to cause a significant sample selection problem for our main 
empirical model. This is because selecting into the sample is mainly determined by extended family level 
characteristics. However, our major variation comes from within-family difference.  
44 
One may concern that the magnitude of the interaction effect in non-linear models can be potentially vulnerable to 
asymptotic bias (Ai and Norton 2003). Thus, we plot the actual marginal effects (Fig. 1) when interpreting our 
results substantively. In addition, we also estimate linear family-fixed-effects models (not shown). The results turn 





′  is a vector of independent variables and 𝛽  are the parameters to be estimated. 
Specifically, 𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ = (1, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗 × 𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑗 , 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑗 × 𝑃𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗 , 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗), where edu refers to 
years of schooling of children; PHealth is self-reported (reported by the respondent) health status 
of the parents45 (from 1 to 5; higher value of this variable represents poorer health condition); and 
Page measures the age of the parents. According to our hypotheses, we expect to observe that the 
main effect of edu is positive, indicating that household benefits from having healthy and young 
parents coreside with highly educated children. On the other hand, the coefficients of the 
interaction terms (𝑒𝑑𝑢 × 𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ and 𝑒𝑑𝑢 × 𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒) should be negative, indicating that when the 
parents become unhealthy and old, the value (utility) from living with higher-educated children 
will decrease. Control is a vector of control variables that differ from one child to another within 
family. In this analysis, we will control for the following children’s characteristics: gender, age, 
dummy for oldest son and occupation categories.  
 In the fixed effect logit / conditional logit model, the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗 of this study 
is a dummy indicating whether child i is coresiding with at least one of the parents (1 for 
coresidence and 0 otherwise). The probability of child i coresiding with parents is modeled as: 







 ,      (2.1) 
where, nj denotes number of children of extended family j. Intuitively, the probability of coresiding 
with child i is modeled as value (exponential utility) from coresiding with child i over the 
summation of value (exponential utility) from coresiding with each child of extended family j. 
Parameters 𝛽 are then identified using maximum likelihood method. 
                                                          
45 In cases where two parents coreside with one child, we use the maximum health status and age of the 




 To identify the coefficients of variables in the fixed-effects model, we need information on 
all married children from the same family. We can acquire information on all children for our key 
variables (education, gender, age, birth order). However, for some important control variables 
(information on spouse and grandchildren), we only have information on the respondent but not 
on his/her siblings. Therefore, one limitation of our analysis would be that we have some omitted 
variables. We will discuss later in the paper how these omitted variables affect our estimations.  
 
2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics of our analytical sample. Panel 1 of Table 2.1 shows 
variables at the children level for the full sample as well as by coresidence status of children. It is 
illustrated that approximately one third of children in our analytical sample are currently living 
with at least one parent. The proportion of females is approximately 47% in the full sample, 11% 
in the coresidence sample and 61% in the non-coresidence sample. Such distributions suggest that 
parents are much more likely to live with sons than daughters. 38% of coresident children are 
oldest sons while only 13% of non-coresident children are oldest sons. A simple comparison of 
means indicates that the cultural story that parents should coreside with oldest sons is still 
significant in Chinese families. Coresident children are, on average, around two years younger 
than non-coresident children. In addition, statistics also show that coresident children, on average, 
receive one more year of schooling than non-coresident children. As for children’s occupations, 
two subgroups do not differ in most job categories except “service workers”, “producers, 
transportation workers” and “homemakers and others”46.  
                                                          
46 In this study, the 9 occupation dummies are constructed based on broad occupation categories specified in the 




 Family-level characteristics are reported in Panel 2 of Table 2.1. Parents are, on average, 
74 years old and their self-reported health status is, on average, 2.7 (between “good” and “so-so”). 
Around 26% of the sample originated from the urban area. 33% of the parents still hold some 
wealth while 67% of the parents hold no wealth at all. Since we are studying sibling comparative 
advantage in this study, we are also interested to know the difference between the most educated 
child and the least educated child within family. In Table 2.1, statistics show that the mean of such 
education gap is 4.66 years of schooling. Thus we do have enough within household education 
variation to identify our empirical model. Finally, to understand the size of the family in our 
analytical sample, we show in the last row of Table 2.1, that, on average, we have information on 
4.13 children for each extended family.  
 
2.5.2 Main Results 
An important assumption of our model is that families do not purchase housework service from 
the labor market. In the Chinese context, the validity of such an assumption depends on the social 
origin of families. Families from rural areas where the labor market is under-developed are less 
likely to utilize the market to provide housework service than families from urban areas. Moreover, 
elderly parents from the urban area are more likely to acquire formal social security. Thus, they 
could purchase housework labor from the market instead of relying on coresident children. We use 
whether the respondent child lives in urban or rural area at the age of 16 to measure social origin 
of the family.47 Alternatively, we can also use current living location of respondent children to 
measure social origin of the extended family. However, it is possible that the respondent child 
                                                          
47  By adopting this measure, we assume that the parents and all their children shared the same major residence when 
the respondent child was 16. Alternatively, family origin could also be measured by mother’s hukou status when the 




migrated from rural to urban after age 16. Then the respondent children’s current living location 
will be different from the rest of the extended family. Therefore we think living location of the 
respondent at age 16 (before possible migration) is more closely associated with whether the 
extended family is from rural or urban area, which determines the lifestyle and acquirable social 
security of the extended family. 
 Table 2.2 shows that, according to our categorization, only 1% of rural-origin children 
report that they purchased some domestic service last year.48 In contrast, around 5% of urban-
origin children claim that they purchased some domestic service last year. The average amount of 
money spent on purchasing is 5 RMB49 per month for rural-origin children, while it is 18 RMB 
per month for urban-origin children. Besides children, parents can also purchase some housework 
service for themselves if they are economically independent. However, Panel 2 of Table 2.2 shows 
that only about 19% of parents from the rural sample are economically independent, while 59% of 
urban parents are independent. Therefore, the majority of parents from the rural sample do not 
have the resource to purchase housework labor by themselves and thus have to rely on their 
children. Based on these observations, we conclude that rural-origin Chinese families purchase 
very little housework service from the market. Thus, we will estimate Equation (2.1) separately 
for the rural sample and urban sample, and we expect our hypotheses are better supported in the 
rural sample.  
 Table 2.3 reports our major findings based on Equation (2.1) estimated using the rural 
sample. In order to compare our findings with previous studies, we estimate both conventional 
logistic regressions and extended family fixed-effects logistic regressions. In all three models we 
                                                          
48 Questions regarding purchase of housework service are only asked to respondent children. Therefore, the statistics 
in Table 2.2 are about all respondent children.   




estimate in Table 2.3, we use education of the children as the first independent variable. We 
estimate three different models. In Model 1, we add interaction between children’s education and 
parents’ health (𝑒𝑑𝑢 × 𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ) as an additional independent variable; in Model 2, we add 
interaction between children’s education and parents’ age (𝑒𝑑𝑢 × 𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒); and in Model 3, we add 
the above two interaction terms simultaneously into the model. In all three models, we control for 
children’s gender and age, whether the child is the oldest son, and occupation category dummies 
of children. 
 Estimated coefficients from Model 1 are quite consistent with our theoretical predictions. 
Both the conventional non-fixed-effects logit model and fixed-effects logit model show that the 
coefficient of children’s education is positive and the coefficient of the interaction between 
children’s education and parents’ health is negative. These results indicate that children’s 
education increases value (utility) from coresidence when parents are healthy. This positive effect 
diminishes when parents’ health status deteriorates as shown by the negative coefficient of the 
interaction term.  
 In Model 2, we find a similar empirical pattern. The coefficient of children’s education is 
positive and the coefficient of the interaction between children’s education and parents’ age is 
negative. In Model 3, when we add two interaction terms simultaneously, the signs of major 
variables do not change. The coefficient of education is positive and the coefficients of the two 
interaction terms are negative. The coefficients of the fixed-effects model are statistically 
significant at least at the 10-percent level. However, the statistical significance of variables 
declines in the traditional logit model and the coefficient of the interaction between education and 




identified in the fixed-effects model. Therefore, our results show the necessity of using an extended 
household fixed-effects empirical framework to identify division of labor within the family. 
 Next, we check quantitatively when the effect of education on value (utility) from 
coresidence turns from positive to negative using estimated coefficients of Model 3. Because we 
include two interactions in Model 3, when we investigate one variable, we hold the other variable 
at the mean. For parents’ health, the effect of education on value (utility) from coresidence will 
turn from positive to negative when health is higher than 2.4. For parents’ age, the effect of 
education on coresidence will turn to negative when age is higher than 72.5 years old.50 Therefore, 
as parents become old and unhealthy, education will eventually have a negative effect on value 
(utility) from coresidence.  
Since we are estimating a nonlinear model, marginal effect of edcuation (especially the 
interaction term) on the probability of coresidence may be different from marginal effect on value 
(utility) from coresidence (coefficients of the fixed effect model) (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
Therefore, in Fig. 1, we explicitly calculate education’s marginal effect on probability of 
coresidence at different values of parents’ health and age. We use estimated coefficients from 
fixed-effect version of Model 1 and Model 2 from Table 2.3 to estimate marginal effects. Fig. 1 
shows clearly that marginal effect of education on probability of coresidence is positive when 
parents are healthy (very good and good) and young (below 68) while marginal effect is negative 
when parents become unhealthy (poor and very poor) and old (>79). These findings support our 
main hypotheses that the probability of coresidence is positively associated with relative education 
                                                          
50  The coefficient of the overall effect of education on coresidence in Model 3 is 0.618+(-0.041*PHealth)+(-
0.007*PAge). First, we hold PAge at sample mean 74. The coefficient is negative when PHealth is higher than 2.4. 




of the children when parents are young and healthy, and negatively associated with education when 
parents are old and unhealthy. 
 Regarding the control variables we added, the variable female has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on value (utility) from coresidence. Chinese parents are still more 
likely to live with sons rather than daughters. This finding supports a persistent cultural effect. 
Another interesting finding is that the oldest son, which is another variable that measures cultural 
factor, has significant effects on coresidence in the traditional logit model but does not have 
significant effects in the fixed-effects model. This finding indicates that once we add sibling 
structure and information into the model, the oldest son does not have priority in coresiding with 
the parents. We interpret this nuance to be evidence that the cultural belief that parents should 
coreside with the oldest son is not very strong in contemporary China and might have been 
overpowered by practical concerns. The difference between the fixed-effects model and the non-
fixed-effects model indicates the limitation of using a traditional logit model where sibling 
structure is completely ignored.  
 Table 2.4 reports our estimations using urban-origin families. None of the key independent 
variables are statistically significant. Therefore, we could not identify division of labor according 
to sibling comparative advantage in urban-origin families. As elaborated at the beginning of this 
section, we suspect that families from urban areas have better access to the housework labor 
market, violating our major theoretical assumptions. In the following sections, we will therefore 







2.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In previous sections, we show the pattern of coresidence according to sibling comparative 
advantage and how it varies by social origin of the families. This section will check the robustness 
of our major findings from the rural sample. Specifically, we examine three major concerns: 
sensitivity to choices of age cutting points, parents’ wealth ownership, and omitted information on 
grandchildren of the family.  
 Our baseline model is restricted to children older than 18, fathers older than 60 and mothers 
older than 55. The choices of these age cutting points are debatable. In Table 2.5, we show that 
our main results are not sensitive to the choice of ages we use to restrict our sample. Specifically, 
we use three different groups of parent-children age cutting-points combinations: 1) children age 
25 or older and parents age 55 or older; 2) children age 18 or older and parents age 60 or older; 
and 3) children age 25 or older and parents age 60 or older. The results of the fixed-effects models 
are shown in Panel 1 to Panel 3 of Table 2.5, respectively. We find no significant difference in the 
magnitude and statistical significance of major coefficients. 
 In addition to robust age cutting points of both children and parents, we also check to see 
whether parents’ wealth ownership affects coresidence pattern. In our theoretical framework, we 
assume that except for housework labor, parents have no other resource endowment. However, in 
reality, retired parents may hold accumulated wealth. They can transfer wealth to their children 
to affect their choices, such as “purchasing piety” (Takagi and Silverstein 2011). Therefore, we 
are also interested in knowing whether parents’ wealth ownership affects the decision with 
whom to coreside within an extended family. Based on available information in our data, we 




parents who own at least some wealth.51 We estimate our baseline model separately for these two 
groups of families. The results are reported in Table 2.6. Panel 1 shows that the results for the 
subgroup that parents hold no wealth are consistent with our baseline model. Therefore, our 
major conclusions apply to parents who have no other resource endowment except their 
housework labor. Panel 2 of Table 2.6 shows that our hypotheses are not supported if parents still 
hold some wealth and can use wealth incentive to affect children’s choices. 
As shown by the existing literature, having more young grandchildren in the family will 
significantly increase housework demand and thus affect coresidence pattern (Zhang 2004; Chu et 
al. 2011). Unfortunately, we could only obtain information on grandchildren for the respondent 
but not for his/her siblings. Therefore, we could not include information on grandchildren as 
control variables in the fixed-effects model. Alternatively we would speculate the direction of bias 
if we omit information on grandchildren, exploiting the well-established fact that education level 
of parents is negatively correlated with number of children (e.g., Axinn and Barber 2001; Martin 
1995). Table 2.7 reports the results of regressing the number of grandchildren in the respondent’s 
family on education level of the respondent. We find that education level of respondent has very 
consistent negative effects on number of grandchildren in our sample. Our main conclusion is that 
if education is negatively correlated with number of grandchildren, omitting the number of 
grandchildren will bias our results towards 0. The reasoning is as follows: When the parents are 
housework providers, having more grandchildren would increase the probability of coresidence, 
so the omitted variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable. The independent 
variable education is negatively correlated with the omitted variable, number of grandchildren. As 
                                                          
51 The first subgroup includes individuals whose parents have already distributed all wealth to children or have no 
wealth to distribute to begin with. The second subgroup includes individuals whose parents have not yet distributed 




a result, the positive effect of education on the probability of coresidence will be underestimated.52 
The true effect will be even higher than our estimation. On the other hand, when the parents are 
housework receivers, having more grandchildren would decrease the probability of coresidence, 
so the omitted variable is negatively correlated with the dependent variable. Thus the negative 
effect of education on the probability of coresidence would be overestimated. The true effect would 
be lower than our estimation. In all, if we believe that education level of children is negatively 
correlated with having grandchildren, the true effects (in absolute value) will be larger than our 
estimation and thus our main conclusions would not be affected by omitting information on the 
number of grandchildren. 
 
2.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Employing a rational choice theoretical framework and family fixed-effects empirical models, 
we show that division of labor does exist when a family is facing resource constraints. Higher- 
educated children specialize in the labor market such that they get help from parents when 
parents can provide housework labor. Lower-educated children specialize in housework such that 
they help parents when parents need help in housework labor. Our results extend Becker’s theory 
on division of labor within the nuclear family to extended family. We show that extended family 
structure affects an individual’s choices. Thus, it is important to take into consideration the 
resource constraints of the entire extended family when we analyze labor-allocation decisions of 
each family member. 
                                                          
52 Omitted variable bias is determined by ∝× 𝛾, where ∝ is the correlation between omitted variable and dependent 
variable, and 𝛾 is the correlation between omitted variable and independent variable. When ∝× 𝛾 > 0, ?̂? > 𝛽, we 




 Our conclusions are drawn using a sample from relatively developed areas of China. Yet 
we find that families from rural areas of these developed areas fit better with our theoretical 
predictions. We believe that this pattern depends on the utilization of the housework market. In 
places with an advanced housework market, a higher-educated child could hire domestic helpers 
to take care of parents and thus does not need to relocate parents to lower-educated siblings. 
Therefore, we believe our hypotheses would be better supported in economically underdeveloped 
areas or areas where the utilization of the housework labor market is strictly not preferred due to 
various reasons. In more developed areas, the division of labor may still exist. Yet, we need more 
detailed information to identify whether children are utilizing the housework labor market.  
 We are one of the first studies that use extended family fixed effects to test models of 
family decisions.53  The benefit of using the family fixed-effects models is that all variations come 
from differences among family members, which matches perfectly with the goal of identifying 
division of labor within family. However, family fixed-effects models entail information on all 
children from the same extended family. This requirement will usually put limitations on the 
number of variables we can use in the models, because it is usually impractical to acquire 
comprehensive information on all children of the extended family through traditional survey 
methods. 
 Thus, having omitted variables would be the major limitation of this research. In previous 
sections, we analyze what will happen if we omit the information on grandchildren in each nuclear 
family. We show that omitting grandchildren would not affect our main results. The second 
important omitted variable that may affect our results is information on the spouses of siblings. If 
                                                          
53 Lei et al. (2011) estimate an extended family fixed-effects model using CHARLS data. Leopold et al. (2014) uses 





positive assortative mating is prevalent in the sample, our conclusions will not be affected. This is 
because in the case of positive assortative mating, education level of siblings can represent 
education level of spouse of siblings. However, our conclusions might be challenged if the higher-
educated child tends to marry a lower-educated spouse so that the spouse could specialize in 
housework and take care of the parents. Neither in the rural sample nor in the urban sample do we 
observe such negative assortative mating between the respondent and his/spouse (the correlation 
coefficient of respondent’s years of schooling and spouse’s years of schooling is 0.44 in the rural 
sample and 0.59 in the urban sample). Such positive correlations still exist even when we conduct 
the same analysis by each education level of the respondent. Also, we are not aware of any survey 
that includes information on spouse of respondent’s siblings that can help us improve our analysis 
from the data perspective.  
 Another limitation of this paper is that we could not investigate within extended family 
monetary transfers. Our theory has important implications on these transfers. In the theoretical 
section, we predict that monetary transfers should flow from relatively higher-educated children 
to lower-educated children in order to relocate parents. When parents are housework labor 
providers, these transfers are as if to buy parents housework service. When parents are housework 
labor receivers, these transfers are as if to buy housework service provided by lower-educated 
siblings. We could not test this hypothesis due to lack of data on transfers among siblings. In the 
existing literature, we also did not find much supporting evidence, because most studies on inter-
household monetary transfers only focus on transfers between parents and children (Altonji et al. 
1997; Logan and Bian 2003). By far financial transfers among siblings are still an understudied 
area. However, our theory points out the possibility that monetary transfers among siblings could 




members. We hope our study will motivate future empirical investigations on monetary flows 
among siblings in an extended family.  
 Third, coresidence is the only resource exchange mechanism we can observe in the data. 
However, substantial resource exchange could take place without coresidence. For example, 
families respond to the needs of resource sharing by living closer instead of fully coresidence. 
Alternative resource exchange mechanism offers another explanation for the rural-urban 
discrepancy in coresidence pattern identified by this paper. It is possible that urban families have 
stronger preference for exchanging resource without coresiding with each other. With current 
dataset, we cannot address this issue. Yet, our theoretical framework can be still applied to the 
analysis of alternative resource sharing mechanisms when appropriate data is made available.  
 Finally, our theory also predicts that coresidence arrangement can change across time as 
changes of parents’ characteristics. For example, when parents become ill, they move from higher 
educated children to lower educated children. Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, we 
cannot keep track of changes across time. We hope high quality panel data that contains 












2.8 TABLES AND FIGURES 
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests have been performed to compare mean differences between coresidents and non-coresidents in panel 1; 
In cases where two parents coreside with one child, we use max health status and age of the two parents (the more unhealthy and the 
older) as the measurement; 
"Number of Observed children within family" refers to the number of observations in an extended family in our analytical sample; 
Due to missing values, the numbers of cases for the variables "Father's Years of Schooling", "Mother's Years of Schooling" and "Parents 
Holing Wealth" are 938, 943 and 963, respectively. 




Table 2.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
                        
            
Panel 1: Children Characteristics 





  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   
Mean-
Diff. SE 
            
Coresidence with Parents 0.31  0.46           
Female 0.46  0.50   0.11  0.32   0.61  0.49   0.50 ***  0.02  
Age 43.93  8.65   42.61  8.81   44.52  8.52   1.90 *** 0.29  
Olest Son 0.21  0.41   0.38  0.49   0.13  0.34   0.25 *** 0.01  
Years of Schooling 7.39  3.70   8.08  3.18   7.07  3.87   1.01 *** 0.13  
Occupation Category for the most Long-Term Job           
    Government Officials / Public Administrators 0.02  0.13   0.01  0.12   0.02  0.13   0.00  0.00  
    Professionals 0.05  0.22   0.05  0.22   0.05  0.23   0.00  0.01  
    Clerical Workers 0.04  0.20   0.04  0.20   0.04  0.20   0.00  0.01  
    Commercial Workers 0.06  0.23   0.05  0.23   0.06  0.23   0.00  0.01  
    Service Workers 0.05  0.22   0.06  0.24   0.05  0.21   0.01 + 0.01  
    Agricultural Workers 0.53  0.50   0.53  0.50   0.54  0.50   0.01  0.02  
    Producers and Transportation Workers 0.19  0.39   0.23  0.42   0.18  0.38   0.05 *** 0.01  
    Other Unclassified Workers 0.02  0.13   0.02  0.13   0.02  0.13   0.00  0.00  
    Homemakers and Others not in the Labor Force 0.04  0.20   0.01  0.08   0.06  0.23   0.05 *** 0.01  
            
Number of Observations 4007    1236    2771        
            
Panel 2: Extended Family Characteristics 
Variables Mean   SD   Minimum   Maximum 
        
Urban Origin 0.26   0.44   0   1  
Health Status of Parents 2.68   0.92   1   5  
Age of Parents 73.75   7.99   55   100  
Father's Years of Schooling 3.91   4.21   0   16  
Mother's Years of Schooling 2.09   3.45   0   16  
Parents Holding Wealth  0.33   0.47   0   1  
Education Difference between the most Educated and 
Least Educated Child 4.66   3.24   0  16  
Number of Children in the Analytical Sample 4.13   1.37   2   7  
         
Number of Families 971  





Table 2.2 Family Origin and the Use of Housework Market 
 
                  
  Rural Origin   Urban Origin   T-Test Statistics 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean Diff. SE 
         
Panel A: Expenditure on Domestic Service         
         
Families Purchased Domestic Service Last Year (Yes = 1; No = 0)         
 0.014 0.118  0.047 0.212  - 0.033 *** 0.011 
         
The Average Amount of Money (￥) Spent Per Month on Domestic Service Last Year 
       
 
5.196 52.802  18.275 100.801  -13.078 *** 5.016 
 
        
Number of Families 713   255       
         
Panel B: Parents' Economic Independence         
         
Parents are Economically Independent (Yes = 1; No = 0)          
 
0.189 0.392  0.587 0.493  - 0.398 *** 0.031 
 
        
Number of Families 709   254       
         
Note: One-tailed t-tests have been performed to test the null hypotheses that mean(rural) - mean(urban) >= 0; 
Expenditure on domestic service refers to the expenditure in children's households; 
The number of families equals the number of respondents in the original dataset. These numbers correspond to the number of families in our  
analytical sample    with a few missing values in the rural sample and in the urban sample, respectively. 







Table 2.3 Determinants of Parent-Child Coresidence in Rural Sample, Between-Family V.S. Within-
Family Comparison 
                  
 Dependent Variable: 1 Coresidence; 0 Non-Coresidence 
Independent Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
  Logit Fixed-Effects   Logit Fixed-Effects   Logit Fixed-Effects 
         
Years of Schooling 0.040+ 0.098  0.147+ 0.518*  0.160* 0.618** 
 (0.022) (0.074)  (0.075) (0.220)  (0.075) (0.226) 
Years of Schooling * Parental Health Status -0.010+ -0.043+     -0.009 -0.041+ 
(Health Status: 1 to 5; 5 is the poorest.) (0.006) (0.025)     (0.006) (0.024) 
Years of Schooling * Parental Age    -0.002+ -0.007*  -0.002+ -0.007* 
    (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.003) 
         
Female -2.903*** -3.551***  -2.902*** -3.538***  -2.906*** -3.550*** 
 (0.150) (0.260)  (0.149) (0.258)  (0.149) (0.260) 
Age -0.035*** -0.062***  -0.029*** -0.065***  -0.029*** -0.065*** 
 (0.006) (0.014)  (0.008) (0.014)  (0.008) (0.014) 
Oldest Son 0.205* 0.209  0.201* 0.195  0.204* 0.205 
 (0.090) (0.421)  (0.090) (0.421)  (0.090) (0.421) 
         
Control for Occupation Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Number of Observations 3,023  3,023  3,023 
Number of Families 714   714   714 
         
    Notes: Logistic and fixed-effects logistic regressions allow clustering at the family level. 






Table 2.4 Determinants of Parent-Child Coresidence in Urban Sample, Between-Family VS. Within-Family 
Comparison 
                  
 Dependent Variable: 1 Coresidence; 0 Non-Coresidence 
Independent Variables Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
  Logit Fixed-Effects   Logit Fixed-Effects   Logit Fixed-Effects 
         
Years of Schooling 0.022 -0.023  -0.119 -0.259  -0.117 -0.258 
 (0.030) (0.088)  (0.094) (0.308)  (0.096) (0.310) 
Years of Schooling * Parental Health Status 0.000 0.004     -0.001 -0.002 
(Health Status: 1 to 5; 5 is the poorest.) (0.005) (0.032)     (0.005) (0.033) 
Years of Schooling * Parental Age    0.002 0.003  0.002 0.003 
    (0.001) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.004) 
         
Female -1.392*** -1.609***  -1.397*** -1.610***  -1.397*** -1.609*** 
 (0.190) (0.269)  (0.190) (0.271)  (0.190) (0.271) 
Age -0.037*** -0.069***  -0.049** -0.070***  -0.049** -0.070*** 
 (0.010) (0.020)  (0.015) (0.020)  (0.015) (0.020) 
Oldest Son 0.448** 0.082  0.429* 0.096  0.429* 0.095 
 (0.170) (0.430)  (0.171) (0.426)  (0.171) (0.431) 
         
Control for Occupation Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Number of Observations 984  984  984 
Number of Families 257   257   257 
         
Notes: Logistic and fixed-effects logistic regressions allow clustering at the family level.     






Table 2.5 Determinants of Parent-Child Coresidence in Rural Sample, by Different Age Cutting 
Points 
                        
 Dependent Variable: 1 Coresidence; 0 Non-Coresidence 
   Panel 1       Panel 2       Panel 3   
Independent Variables Child >= 25 and Parent >= 55   Child >= 18 and Parent >= 60   Child >= 25 and Parent >= 60   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
            
Years of Schooling 0.098 0.519* 0.620**  0.094 0.483* 0.585*  0.093 0.483* 0.587* 
 (0.074) (0.220) (0.227)  (0.074) (0.222) (0.229)  (0.074) (0.222) (0.230) 
Years of Schooling * Parental Health Status -0.042+  -0.041+  -0.042+  -0.041+  -0.042+  -0.041+ 
(Health Status: 1 to 5; 5 is the poorest.) (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Years of Schooling * Parental Age  -0.007* -0.007*   -0.007* -0.007*   -0.007* -0.007* 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
            
Female -3.545*** -3.532*** -3.546***  -3.542*** -3.527*** -3.540***  -3.536*** -3.521*** -3.536*** 
 (0.260) (0.258) (0.260)  (0.262) (0.260) (0.262)  (0.261) (0.259) (0.262) 
Age -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.065***  -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.066***  -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Oldest Son 0.213 0.199 0.209  0.198 0.186 0.195  0.203 0.190 0.199 
 (0.421) (0.421) (0.421)  (0.423) (0.422) (0.423)  (0.423) (0.423) (0.423) 
            
Control for Occupation Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Number of Observations 3,018  2,970  2,965 
Number of Families 714   699   699 
            
Notes: Fixed-effects logistic regressions allow clustering at the family level.         






Table 2.6 Determinants of Parent-Child Coresidence in Rural Sample, by Parental Wealth Ownership 
Status 
                
 Dependent Variable: 1 Coresidence; 0 Non-Coresidence 
Independent Variables Panel 1: Holding No Wealth   Panel 2: Holding Some Wealth 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Years of Schooling 0.182* 0.646* 0.798**  -0.121 0.442 0.406 
 (0.081) (0.262) (0.247)  (0.173) (0.463) (0.553) 
Years of Schooling * Parental Health Status -0.065*  -0.064*  0.010  0.014 
(Health Status: 1 to 5; 5 is the poorest.) (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.061)  (0.058) 
Years of Schooling * Parental Age  -0.008* -0.008**   -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.006) (0.006) 
        
Female -3.686*** -3.635*** -3.672***  -3.460*** -3.478*** -3.483*** 
 (0.324) (0.317) (0.324)  (0.464) (0.471) (0.469) 
Age -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.061***  -0.080** -0.083*** -0.084*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Oldest Son 0.022 0.035 0.027  0.359 0.382 0.368 
 (0.554) (0.546) (0.552)  (0.621) (0.642) (0.627) 
        
Control for Occupation Dummies Yes  Yes 
        
Number of Observations 2,170  832 
Number of Families 495   212 
        
        Notes: "Holding No Wealth" refers to either 1) All wealth has been distributed to children; or 2) No wealth could be distributed. "Holding Some Wealth"   
        refers to either 1) All wealth has not been distributed; or 2) A portion of wealth has not been distributed; 
        Fixed-effects logistic regressions allow clustering at the family level. 







Table 2.7 The Effect of Education on the Number of Grandchildren for 
Respondents 
                
 Dependent Variable: The Number of Grandchildren 
Independent Variables Panel 1: Rural Origin  Panel 2: Urban Origin 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9   Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
        
Years of Schooling -0.029*** -0.023* -0.024*  -0.063*** -0.045* -0.043* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) 
        
Female -0.005 0.018 0.013  0.001 0.058 0.064 
 (0.057) (0.063) (0.064)  (0.110) (0.115) (0.119) 
Age 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.026***  0.015* 0.012+ 0.012 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Spouse's Years of Schooling  -0.011 -0.011   -0.027 -0.022 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.019) (0.020) 
Father's Years of Schooling   -0.001    0.004 
   (0.009)    (0.016) 
Mother's Years of Schooling   -0.002    -0.017 
   (0.012)    (0.018) 
        
Constant -0.356* -0.256 -0.269  0.145 0.319 0.287 
 (0.178) (0.188) (0.192)  (0.379) (0.394) (0.415) 
        
Number of Families 713 705 680   257 254 240 
        
Notes: The number of families equals to the number of respondents in the original dataset. These  
numbers correspond to the number of families in our analytical sample with certain missing values under  
different model specifications; 
All models are estimated by poission regressions. 







Fig. 2.1 Marginal Effect of Education on the Probability of Coresidence by 
Parents’ Health Status and Parents’Age 
 
Notes: Point estimates with 95% confidence interval are shown in the figure. Figure on parents’ health status is based 
on estimates from Model 1 (Fixed-effect) of Table 2.3. Figure on parents’ age is based on Model 2 (Fixed-effects) of 





CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACTS OF THE THREE GORGES DAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION: ARE THERE LONG RUN ADAPTATIONS? 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
By turning potential energy generated by the flow of a natural river into electricity, gigantic 
hydroelectric dams are believed to provide a low-carbon, long-term reliable, and safe source of 
energy. An increasing amount of public attention and funds have been devoted to hydroelectric 
programs, especially after the Fukushima incident cast further doubts about the use of nuclear 
power. More than 620 large hydroelectric dams are currently under construction, and over 3,000 
are planned to be built in the near future, mainly in Asia and Latin America, to meet the ever-
growing demand for energy in these developing economies (Zarfl et al., 2015). Despite the great 
potential of hydroelectric power to solve the future energy crisis, relatively less is known about 
the long-term environmental costs of these dams. Hydrologists have long suspected that large 
hydroelectric dams can permanently affect the local climate in the reservoir and the downstream 
region of the dam by changing the pattern of water flow and altering the river’s water cycle 
(Hossain et al., 2009). Climate change can also directly affect socioeconomic outcomes, which 
change the cost–benefit calculations in decisions about whether to construct hydroelectric dams. 
 In this study, we find that the Three Gorges Dam (TGD), the world’s largest 
hydroelectric dam, has caused unexpected climate change in a vast downstream region. 
Specifically, we find that downstream of the TGD, the total monthly precipitation in areas close 
to the Yangtze River (within 200 km) has decreased relative to areas 200–400 km away since the 
dam’s construction in 2003. We also find that the negative effects on precipitation are especially 




the water cycle in the Yangtze River governed by the TGD for electricity generation. The TGD 
tends to store water in the reservoir of the dam during winter and spring, which are the dry 
seasons of the river. The resulting decrease in the flow of water leads to a decline in precipitation 
downstream of the dam. 
 In addition to the unexpected impacts on precipitation, we also find that the TGD also 
increases the average air temperature within the reservoir and reduces the incidence of extreme 
precipitation represented by droughts. We argue that the increase in temperature is caused by the 
water stored inside the reservoir, which helps to preserve heat. The effects on droughts are 
consistent with one of the main objectives of the TGD – to change the flow of water in order to 
limit extreme fluctuations in precipitation. However, both effects are limited to areas that are 
very close to the TGD. Therefore, the small range of effects prevents the changes in temperature 
and droughts to generate large and significant impacts on social and economic outcomes. 
The permanent and long-run shocks on climate change induced by the TGD provide a 
unique opportunity to study the effects of climate change on agricultural production and identify 
short- and long-run human adaptations (if any) to climate change, which have long been difficult 
to identify (Burke and Emerick, 2016). Studies that evaluate the impacts of climate change 
usually rely on year-to-year weather variations (Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007; Dell et al., 
2012; Zhang et al., 2017). However, it is argued in previous studies that the long-run impacts of 
climate change are impossible to be captured by short-term, transitory weather shocks because 
these short-run impacts could be mitigated by the slow adjustments of economic agents (Dell et 
al., 2014; Hornbeck, 2012; Taraz, 2017). To overcome the difficulty of identifying the effects of 
long-run climate change, Hornbeck (2012) introduces a new method by studying the impacts of 




change by examining a permanent weather shock triggered by a large environmental catastrophe. 
Although this method is promising in theory, studies have noticed that “finding geographically 
isolated, permanent climate shocks that one can follow empirically is challenging” (Dell et al., 
2014).  
To address this challenge, we use the unexpected permanent climate change caused by the 
construction of the TGD as a natural experiment with which to identify the long-run impacts of 
climate change on agricultural production and human adaptation. We find that the yields of rice, 
which is the major grain crop in the downstream region, decreased by around 12 percent in 
regions where the TGD reduced total precipitation. The negative effects on rice yields are 
especially significant in hilly regions, and areas where water is scarce. Therefore, rural 
households that were more vulnerable to water shortages before the dam was built suffer more 
from the reduction in precipitation caused by the dam. We also find ambiguous results on corn 
and wheat yields.  In most of the specifications, we find statistically insignificant negative effects 
because corn and wheat are not the major grain crops grown in this region. Therefore, our small 
sample size lacks the statistical power to identify negative effects on corn and wheat yields.54 
In terms of adaptation, we find that farmers’ adaptations to this long-run climate shock have 
been limited and slow. In response to the drop in rice yields, farmers have chosen to significantly 
increase short-run factor inputs, such as land, labor and irrigation expenditure, in the cultivation 
of rice to maintain output levels. Even though these responses help to alleviate the food shortage 
problem in the short run, they are not economically efficient in the long run. We found no 
evidence that farmers have tried to enhance their economic efficiency through switching to 
                                                          
54 In one of the specifications, we identify statistically significant negative effects on corn yields. However, the 
sample size is further reduced in this specification due to missing values in agricultural inputs. Therefore, the 




drought-resistant crops, engaging in non-farm employment, mechanizing production or 
migrating away from the affected region. As a result, the decrease in rice yields persists and does 
not show any signs of recovery 10 years after the dam’s construction. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the economic impacts of dams (Duflo and 
Pande, 2007; Chakravarty, 2011; Sarsons, 2015). Most previous studies focus on the effects of 
irrigation dams and find that they reduce farmers’ vulnerability to climate change, especially 
negative rainfall shocks. Irrigation dams have been shown to benefit farmers in various economic 
outcomes, including enhancing agricultural productivity, reducing poverty and infant mortality 
because farmers become less sensitive to rainfall shocks. In contrast to the literature on irrigation 
dams, we find that hydroelectric dams, which are usually much larger in capacity, generate 
unexpected direct impacts on climate change represented by decreasing the level of total 
precipitation. Thus, by using the construction of the world’s largest hydroelectric dam as a 
natural experiment, our study contributes uniquely to the literature by illustrating the impacts of 
climate change itself instead of the effects of sensitivity to climate change on economic 
outcomes.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the construction 
of the TGD. The third section introduces the data used in the analysis. The fourth section 
discusses the empirical models. The fifth section presents the empirical results, and the last 
section concludes and discusses possible future extensions of the paper. 
 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
This section describes the construction of the TGD. We emphasize on the definition of the 




building the dam. We also discuss anecdotal evidence showing that the TGD causes climate 
change.  
 The TGD is the world’s largest hydroelectric dam in terms of installed capacity (22,500 
MW). It is located in Yichang, Hubei Province and spans the Yangtze River. The Yangtze runs 
from the west to the east of China and the longitude of the dam is around 111 degrees, which we 
use to separate it into upstream (<111 degrees longitude) and downstream (>111 degrees) 
regions. The TGD stores water and creates a reservoir in the upstream region. The Three Gorges 
Reservoir Region includes 25 county-level districts that are directly or indirectly involved in the 
submersion of the water storage. The region has an area of 59,900 km2 and a population of 16 
million.  
 We define 2003 as the first year of the dam’s effects on climate change, even though its 
construction was not finished until 2006. The plan to build the TGD was passed in the congress 
in 1992, and construction started in 1994. The most crucial year for the TGD was 2003, when the 
water level inside the reservoir was risen abruptly from 66 m to 135 m in June, which was the 
largest rise in the dam’s history. In September 2006, when the dam was finally completed, the 
water level was risen again to 156 m, which was a relatively minor change compared with 
previous sharp increase. Because we believe the climate changes are caused by the water stored 
upstream of the dam, 2003, when the rise of the water level was the most significant, is a more 
appropriate measure of the beginning of the TGD effects.  
 In addition to producing electricity, the TGD was also designed to increase the Yangtze 
River’s shipping capacity and reduce the potential for extreme weather downstream of the dam 





 The debate over the TGD’s impact on climate change started right after its construction 
and escalated in 2010 after unprecedented large-scale droughts were observed in the downstream 
region. Rainfall in the Yangtze River basin was 40 percent below average, and the downstream 
region experienced its worst drought in 50 years. Hydrological studies have documented a 
decrease in water levels in downstream lakes and observation sites along the Yangtze River (Du 
and Liu, 2013; Li et al., 2013; Mei et al., 2015), and have identified changes in the air 
temperature in the reservoir (Deng et al., 2012). 
 
3.3 DATA 
Our analysis combines gridded monthly time-series data on weather from 1995 to 2014 with 
household-level panel data collected by the Rural Economy Research Center of the Chinese 
Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
3.3.1 Gridded Monthly Weather Data  
We use weather data from the Global Historical Climatology Network Monthly (GHCNM) 
Version 3 (GHCN3) dataset and Legates and Willmott's (1990a and b) station records55. The 
data include monthly and annual mean air temperature and total precipitation. This is one of the 
gridded data products developed by climate scientists by interpolating values among the 
observation data from ground weather stations. Monthly average air temperature and total 
precipitation are interpolated to a 0.5-degree x 0.5-degree latitude/longitude grid. The value of 
each grid is interpolated using a combination of three spatial interpolation methods: digital-
                                                          
55 We used a total of 7,280 GHCN stations for air temperature and 20,782 GHCN stations for precipitation. 
However, only about 1,600 to 5,400 GHCN stations for air temperature and around 1,100 to 14,800 GHCN stations 
for precipitation were actually available each year. The number of stations (and oceanic grid nodes) taken from the 





elevation-model assisted interpolation (Willmott and Matsuura, 1995), traditional interpolation 
(Willmott et al., 1985), and climatologically aided interpolation (Willmott and Robeson, 1995). 
An average of 20 nearby stations may influence the estimated value of each grid node.  
Gridded weather datasets are good sources of information on temperature and precipitation 
in economic analysis, because they provide a balanced panel that potentially adjusts for issues 
such as missing station data. The datasets also allow us to aggregate the grid-level data to the 
village or county level and then match the data with economically important variables. To check 
the robustness of our findings, we also directly use ground weather station data from China, 
which is used to interpolate the grid level data by climate scientists, and find similar results.   
 
3.3.2 National Fixed-Point Household Survey on Agriculture 
We use data on agricultural production and household behavior from the National Fixed-Point 
Survey (NFS) conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. This survey, which was 
initiated in 1986, tracks a nationally representative sample of about 20,000 rural households in 
approximately 300 villages, covering all of the continental Chinese provinces. The NFS consists 
of both village and household surveys. Within each sampled village, households are randomly 
selected to complete the survey. The household survey used in this paper, covering 1995–2014, 
consists of a panel of about 7,000 households across 94 villages in 10 provinces. NFS villages 
were selected for representativeness based on region, income, cropping patterns, population, and 
non-farm activities. The NFS contains detailed information on household agricultural production, 
consumption, asset accumulation, employment, and income. Benjamin, Brandt and Giles (2005) 




The panel structure of the data and the detailed information on household production decisions 
are a good fit for our analysis. 
 The data on agricultural production show that rice is a much more important grain crop in 
this region than wheat and corn: around 58 percent of households grow rice, while only 33 and 
24 percent, respectively, grow wheat and corn. Around 64 percent of the land is used for rice 
cultivation, 26 percent for wheat cultivation, and less than 10 percent for corn. 
 
3.4 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
This section shows the empirical models to estimate the effects of the TGD on local climate 
change, crop yields and adaptation. We use a difference-in-differences empirical framework to 
compare locations that are close to the Yangtze River with those that are farther away from the 
Yangtze before and after the dam was constructed, assuming that regions close to the river are 
more likely to be affected by the construction of the dam. Since we lack pre-existing knowledge 
of the range of the TGD’s effects, we use three different specifications: (1) comparing regions 
within 100 km of the Yangtze River with those that are 100–200 km from it, and (2) comparing 
regions within 200 km of the river with those that are 200–400 km from it, and (3) using a 
continuous measure of distance in the model.  
The major identification assumption of this difference-in-differences approach is that the 
time trends of the outcome variables are parallel between the treatment group (regions close to 
the Yangtze) and the control group (regions farther away from the Yangtze). In the third part of 
this section, we present the models to test the parallel pre-trends assumption of the difference-in-






3.4.1 The Effects of the TGD on Climate Change 
First, we use the following baseline model to compare regions within 100 km of the Yangtze 
River with those that are 100–200 km away: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,100 × 𝑃𝑡,2003 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,        (3.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes the climate-dependent variable, including average air temperature, extreme 
precipitation incidence and total precipitation; 𝐷𝑖,100 denotes all grids that are within 100 km of 
the Yangtze River; 𝑃𝑡,2003 is a dummy variable indicating after 2003; 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜇𝑡 are grid and year 
fixed effects, respectively. The model is estimated using a sample of all grids that are within 200 
km of the river. As a result, coefficient 𝛽1 captures the differences between regions within 100 
km of the Yangtze with those that are 100–200 km from the river before and after 2003. 
Second, we compare regions within 200 km of the Yangtze River with those that are 
200–400 km from the river using the following model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑖,200 × 𝑃𝑡,2003 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡,   (3.2) 
where 𝐷𝑖,200 denotes all grids that are within 200 km of the river. The model is estimated using a 
sample of all grids that are within 400 km of the river. Therefore, coefficient 𝛼1 captures the 
differences between regions within 200 km of the river and those that are 200–400 km away 
from the river before and after 2003. 
 Third, we also estimate the following model using a continuous distance measure: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖 × 𝑃𝑡,2003 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,    (3.3) 
where 𝐷𝑖 measures the distance from grid i to the Yangtze. 𝛾1 captures the different effects of the 
TGD by the distance from the grids to the river.  
 




We use a similar difference-in-differences empirical strategy to estimate the TGD’s effects on 
crop yields and adaptation in regions that have experienced an unexpected decrease in total 
precipitation. The empirical model is estimated at the household level and is specified as follows: 
𝑌𝑚𝑛𝑡 = 𝜎0 + 𝜎1𝐷𝑛,200 × 𝑃𝑡,2003 + 𝜎2𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑡 + 𝑍𝑚𝑛𝑡𝜎 + θ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜔𝑚𝑛𝑡,        (3.4) 
where m denotes household and n denotes the village. 𝑌𝑚𝑛𝑡 denotes the outcome variables 
including crop yields and other measures of adaptation at the household level. 𝐷𝑛,200 indicates 
that village n is within 200 km of the Yangtze. Model (3.4) is estimated using all villages within 
400 km of the river. To control for the effects of economies of scale, we include the total sowing 
area of each crop 𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑡 as the control variable in all models. We also include additional 
control variables 𝑍𝑚𝑛𝑡, including input controls and policy controls. For input controls, we 
control for labor, fertilizer, pesticide and plastic sheeting inputs for each crop. For policy 
controls, we control for three important agricultural policy changes: agricultural tax reform, 
property rights reform (Chari et al., 2017) and the policy to return farmland to forest. We also 
include household fixed effects θ𝑚 in all model specifications at the household level. 
 
3.4.3 The Effects of the TGD over Time 
To test the parallel pre-trends assumption of the difference-in-differences model, we estimate the 
effects of the TGD over time. To estimate the effects of the TGD over time for Model (3.1), we 
estimate the following model:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑0 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝐷𝑖,100 × 𝑃𝑡𝑘
2014
𝑘=1991 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡,       (3.5) 
where 𝑃𝑡𝑘 is a dummy variable denoting year k from 1991–2014. We estimate all coefficients 
𝜑𝑘s, which capture the differences between the treatment and control groups in each year. Then 




addition to equation (3.5), we also estimate the effects-over-time model for all other empirical 
models specified in previous sections and plot the results to check for parallel pre-trends.  
 
3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 This section reports the main empirical findings of this study. First, we show the effects 
of the TGD on average air temperature, extreme precipitation incidence and total precipitation. 
Then we evaluate how the unexpected climate change caused by the TGD, represented by the 
decrease in rainfall, has affected the yields of different crops, especially rice. Finally, we study 
whether farmers have adapted to the climate change in the long run.  
 
3.5.1 Effects on Climate Change 
 In this subsection, we show the effects of the TGD on climate change. We report our 
estimated results separately for the downstream region, the reservoir, and the upstream region 
because we expect to observe different impacts in these regions.  
Table 3.2 shows that the TGD significantly increased the temperature in the upstream 
region, especially within the reservoir. Columns (1)–(3) are estimated following equations (3.1)–
(3.3), respectively. In Column (1) of Panel B, we analyze the effects on grids inside the reservoir 
and find that, compared with grids that are 100–200 km from the Yangtze River, the average air 
temperature of grids within 100 km of the river increases by 0.19 degrees Celsius. Similarly, in 
Column (2) of Panel B, we find that, compared with grids that are 200–400 km from the 
Yangtze, the average temperature of grids within 200 km of the river increases by 0.23 degrees 
Celsius inside the reservoir. The model using a continuous measure of distance also shows 




decreases as we move away from the Yangtze River inside the reservoir. All coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 In contrast to the positive effects on average temperature inside the reservoir of the dam, 
we do not find statistically significant effects on average temperature in the downstream regions. 
Figure 3.1.1 shows the exact locations where we identify the increases in average temperature. In 
Figure 3.1.1, we estimate the difference-in-differences empirical model by the longitude of the 
grids. We find that the most significant increases in temperature are from grids between 
longitude 108 and 111, which are from inside the reservoir and very close to the dam. Therefore, 
we believe the positive effects on temperature inside the reservoir are due to the “hot tub effect” 
(Zachary, 2012), which indicates that water stored inside the reservoir helps to preserve heat and 
increases average air temperature.  
One of the major purposes of the TGD is to control extreme precipitation incidence, and 
our analysis of the pattern of extreme precipitation, reported in Table 3.3, confirms that it does. 
We find that the TGD significantly reduces the incidence of droughts in both the downstream 
and upstream regions. Droughts are defined as monthly precipitation lower than the 15th 
percentile of the historical precipitation distribution in the same month and grid. Similarly, 
floods are defined as monthly precipitation higher than the 85th percentile of the historical 
precipitation distribution in the same month and grid.56 Column (1) of Table 3.4 shows that the 
TGD reduces the incidence of droughts in the downstream regions. However, the effect is only 
significant if we compare grids within 100 km of the Yangtze River with grids that are 100–200 
km from the river, indicating that the range of the effects on droughts in the downstream region 
is relatively limited. In contrast, the negative effects on droughts in the upstream region are 
                                                          




statistically significant in all specifications. We find no effects on the incidence of floods in most 
of the specifications from Columns (4)–(6). 
  In addition to the effects on average temperature and extreme precipitation, which were 
to some extent anticipated when the dam was designed, we find that the TGD unexpectedly 
reduced total precipitation in a very large downstream region. Table 3.4 shows that the dam has 
significantly decreased total precipitation in the downstream region, and the effects are 
especially large in spring. The TGD’s effects on precipitation are more clearly identified if we 
compare grids within 200 km of the Yangtze River with those that are 200–400 km from the 
river, indicating that its effects on precipitation extend farther than its effects on temperature. 
Column (5) of Panel A shows that total monthly precipitation decreased by around 11.7 mm, 
which represents roughly a 12 percent decrease.   
 Columns (4)–(6) of Table 3.4 show that the decrease in precipitation in downstream 
regions is especially large in spring, which is consistent with the changes in the pattern of the 
flow of water along the Yangtze River after the dam was constructed. In order to maximize its 
capability to generate electricity, the TGD tends to store water during winter and spring, which 
are the dry seasons of the river, and release water during summer and autumn, which are the wet 
seasons. This hypothesis is confirmed by studying the records on water flow from downstream 
observation sites after the dam’s construction (Figure 3.2.2). The figure illustrates a clear 
seasonal pattern that the TGD reduces water flow in winter and spring yet increases the flow in 
summer and autumn. Figure 3.2.1 shows the effects of the TGD on precipitation by season. The 
pattern of the effects on precipitation is quite consistent with the effects on water flow, indicating 




electricity generation. The TGD changes the water distribution between the downstream and 
upstream regions, and therefore influences the pattern of precipitation in these regions as well. 
In addition to the negative effects on precipitation in the downstream region, Table 3.3 
also identifies positive effects on precipitation in the upstream region, although the magnitude of 
the effects is smaller. Figure 3.1.3 shows the effects of the TGD on precipitation estimated using 
the difference-in-differences empirical framework by the longitude of each grid. The figure 
clearly shows that the negative effects on precipitation in the downstream region are relatively 
large in magnitude and concentrated mainly in regions where the longitude is larger than 113 
degrees. In contrast, the positive effects on precipitation in the upstream region are relatively 
small and concentrated within the reservoir between longitude 107 degrees and 110 degrees. 
The region that has suffered from the reduction in total precipitation seems to be much 
larger than the region that has benefited from the reduction in droughts. Figure 3.1.2 shows the 
effects of the TGD on extreme precipitation incidence estimated using the difference-in-
differences empirical framework by the longitude of each grid. It illustrates that regions that have 
benefited from the reduction in droughts are concentrated in an area around the TGD between 
longitude 108 degrees and 113 degrees. In other downstream regions, where the reduction in 
total precipitation has been more significant, we do not find any effects on extreme precipitation 
incidence. 
Finally, we estimate the effects of the TGD on climate variables over time to check the 
assumption of the parallel time trends between the treatment and control groups in the 
difference-in-differences empirical framework. Figure 3.3 shows the effects of the TGD on 
average temperature, extreme precipitation incidence and total precipitation over time. The 




Figure 3.3.1 shows that the treatment (within 100 km) and control (100–200 km) groups had 
very similar temperatures before 2003. After 2003, there was a sharp increase in the differences 
between the groups. Figure 3.3.2 shows the differences in extreme precipitation incidence over 
time. We observe more fluctuations in this case. However, the level that the differences in 
extreme precipitation are fluctuating around still exhibits a significant drop after 2003. Figure 
3.3.3 reveals a similar pattern: the level around which the differences in total precipitation are 
fluctuating also exhibits a significant drop after 2003. 
 
3.5.2 The Effects on Crop Yields 
 In this subsection, we evaluate the impacts of unexpected precipitation drop caused by 
the construction of the TGD on the yields of different crops. To achieve this purpose, we exclude 
the upstream region from our analysis, because the TGD generated direct impacts on locations 
inside the reservoir. For example, the dam flooded lands that were originally used for agriculture. 
The TGD also produced large-scale out-migration in areas close to the reservoir, which can 
affect all aspects of economic activity. Therefore, we focus only on the downstream region, 
which is unlikely to have been directly affected by the construction of the dam, to study the 
impacts of the drop in precipitation on agricultural production.  
We find that rice yields decreased in areas where the dam unexpectedly reduced the total 
precipitation. Table 3.5 shows that rice yields decrease if we compare villages that are within 
200 km of the Yangtze with villages that are 200–400 km from the river before and after 2003. 
We show earlier that if we compare regions within 200 km with those that are 200–400 km 
away, we can identify a significant decrease in total precipitation, yet no significant changes in 




was caused by the decrease in total precipitation. This claim is further supported by the 
heterogenous analysis in Table 3.6. Panel A estimates the effects of the TGD by longitude. It 
shows that the negative effects on rice yields are mainly concentrated in areas where the 
longitude is larger than 113 degrees, which is consistent with the area in which we identify a 
large reduction in precipitation in Figure 3.1.3. The consistency in the range of the decrease in 
rice yields and the decrease in precipitation strengthens the claim that the decrease in rice yields 
is caused by the reduction in precipitation. 
Table 3.5 estimates the effects on wheat and corn yields. We find similar empirical 
patterns as the effects on rice yields, yet most of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Because wheat and corn are not grown by every household in the sample, the sample size is too 
small to identify the effects on wheat and corn yields. 
We conduct three additional analyses to study the heterogenous effects of the TGD on 
rice yields, and the results are shown in Table 3.6. First, the effects of the TGD on rice yields can 
be affected by the availability of irrigation facilities. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the 
effects of the TGD by the type of terrain of the villages, assuming that villages on flat terrain are 
more likely to have irrigation facilities than those located in hilly areas. Panel B of Table 3.6 
shows that the effects of the TGD are mainly found in hilly villages, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis. Due to the difficulty of accessing irrigation facilities, hilly villages have to rely more 
on rainfall and therefore are more likely to be affected by the changes in precipitation.  Second, 
the TGD may have had a greater effect on rice yields in villages where water is relatively 
scarcer. The village survey asks whether water is a scarce resource for each village. Using this 




are consistent with our anticipations. Panel C of Table 3.6 shows that the effects of the TGD are 
mainly found in villages where water is scarce.  
Finally, we test the parallel pre-trends assumption for the effects of the TGD on rice 
yields. Coefficients that show the effects of the TGD on the yields of different crops are shown 
in Figure 3.4. Figure 3.4.1 shows the dam’s effect on rice yields within 200 km of the Yangtze 
River. The differences between the treatment and control groups do not exhibit significant pre-
trends before 2003. However, the differences between the groups decrease sharply in 2003, 
indicating that the changes in rice yields are indeed due to the sharp rise in water levels 
generated by the dam project in that year. However, similar graphs for wheat and corn yields in 
the same region and time period do not show significant changes over time.  
 
3.5.3 Adaptation 
 In previous sections, we have shown that the construction of the TGD in 2003 causes 
climate changes in the long-run in areas around the Yangtze, and the unexpected drop in total 
precipitation due to the construction of the dam affects the yields of agricultural crops. Thus, it is 
also interesting to study whether farmers have systematically adapted to the changes in 
precipitation in the 10 years since the dam’s construction. In this subsection, we address possible 
adaptations from multiple perspectives, including cropping patterns, the distribution of labor 
among crops and sectors, and the structure of agricultural inputs. 
 Table 3.7 reports our finding that farmers’ adaptations to the long-run climate shock have 
been limited and slow. Columns (1)–(4) show the effects of the TGD on cropping patterns within 
200 km of the Yangtze River. Column (1) studies the dam’s effects on the intensive margin of 




to rice cultivation. Column (2) studies the dam’s effects on the extensive margin of changes in 
the rice cultivation areas, which measures whether non-rice farmers have switched to cultivating 
rice. We only find positive effects on the intensive margin of rice cultivation in areas that 
experienced a decrease in precipitation and rice yields. This finding is consistent with the 
subsistence farming hypothesis: farmers have devoted more land to rice production in response 
to the decrease in yields in order to reach a subsistence level of rice output. This hypothesis is 
also supported by the findings from Column (4), which shows increases in agricultural labor 
input in the same region. We think this finding implies that farmers’ responses to the changes in 
rice yields are still very short sighted, and do not represent rational adaptions through optimizing 
their resource allocations. Regarding other outcome variables, we do not find significant effects 
on the total area of food crops, the total area of economic crops or the level of out-migration of 
labor from households. 
 We also study whether farmers have adapted to climate changes by varying the structure 
of agricultural inputs in rice cultivation and find that in regions that have experienced a decrease 
in total precipitation, farmers have significantly increased their irrigation expenditure. The data 
on agricultural inputs, however, are not ideal for this analysis because we have expenditure data 
for many variables only after 2003. Therefore, in our analysis of agricultural inputs, we cannot 
compare the outcome variables before and after 2003. Instead, we plot the differences in the 
outcome variables between the treatment and control groups since 2003 to study whether there 
were significant changes in the structure of inputs after 2003. This analysis therefore provides 
weaker evidence than previous analyses that are based on the difference-in-differences empirical 
framework. Figure 3.5 shows the differences between the treatment and control groups after 




River with those that are 200–400 km from the river and only find statistically significant effects 
on irrigation expenditure. Irrigation expenditure rose significantly after 2003 in response to the 
decrease in total precipitation. We find no significant effects on other inputs, including labor, 
land and machinery inputs after 2003. 
 While farmers have engaged in some behavioral responses to the changes in total 
precipitation, we argue that these responses have been far from optimal in the long run. For 
example, we find that farmers have increased their rice cultivation areas in response to the 
decrease in rice yields in order to provide enough food. However, switching to other crops to 
achieve a higher level of specialization may be an economically more efficient option in the long 
run. Similarly, increasing irrigation expenditure is also a temporary response that may not be 
economically efficient in the long run. Our claim is further supported by studying the time trends 
in Figure 4.1. The drop in rice yields in 2003 persists after 10 years without a significant sign of 
recovery, indicating that no obvious long-run adaption measures have been implemented during 
this period. 
 
3.5.4 Robustness Checks 
We conduct additional tests to check the robustness of our main empirical findings. Specifically, 
crop yields can also be affected by various agricultural policies and reforms, some of which 
occurred around 2003. Our study addresses three types of possible agricultural reforms in this 
time period: agricultural tax reform, property rights reform (Chari et al., 2017) and the policy to 
return farmland to forest. We generate measures of policy implementations to denote whether a 
village in a specific year was under one of these three policy reforms. We control for these 




Table 3.8. We find that adding policy controls does not change our main results on crop yields. 
Therefore, we are confident that the time trends of agricultural policies do not vary significantly 
between our treatment and control groups, and that our difference-in-differences empirical 
strategy is strong enough to control for the common trends in agricultural policies. 
 
3.6 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this study, we show that the construction of the TGD has significantly reduced the total 
precipitation in a large region downstream of the dam. This decrease in precipitation has led to a 
long-term decrease in rice yields, which is the main food crop in this region. However, we find 
little evidence to suggest that farmers have optimally adapted to the decrease in precipitation for 
the long run. Farmers have tended to respond by increasing their irrigation expenditure and 
investing more land and labor into the cultivation of rice. Both measures help to alleviate the 
food shortage problem in the short run, yet may not be optimal in the long run. In the future we 
will further explore whether these patterns of adaptation are associated with the level of 












3.7 TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std Mean Std 
 Within 200km Within 400km 
Panel A: Weather Variables 
Temperature (°C) 15.90 8.34 14.91 8.67 
Precipitation (mm) 103.38 88.41 98.58 88.91 
Droughts 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Floods 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 
Panel B: Crop Yields (log (yields kg/mu)) 
Rice 6.11 0.33 6.08 0.37 
Wheat 5.58 0.48 5.63 0.47 
Corn 5.66 0.61 5.70 0.61 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of major variables. Panel A shows the summary statistics of 
weather variables used in the analysis of the Three Gorges Dam on local climate changes. Panel B shows the 
summary statistics of crop yields. All variables are shown by a sample of locations within 200 km of the Yangtze 








Table 3.2: The Effects of the Three Gorges Dam on Average Temperature 
 Temperature (°C) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 100km vs. 200km 200km vs. 400km Continuous Distance 
Panel A: Down Stream 
After 2003× 
within 100km 
-0.012   
(0.032)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 0.021  
 (0.022)  
After 2003× 
Distance 
  -0.001 
  (0.00028) 
Number of 
Observations 
42600 78300 42600 
Panel B: Reservoir 
After 2003× 
within 100km 
0.19***   
(0.051)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 0.23***  
 (0.040)  
After 2003× 
Distance 
  -0.0018*** 
  (0.0005) 
Number of 
Observations 
32100 60300 32100 
Panel C: Up Stream 
After 2003× 
within 100km 
0.14***   
(0.046)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 0.11***  
 (0.030)  
After 2003× 
Distance 
  -0.0013*** 
  (0.0005) 
Number of 
Observations 
40800 91500 40800 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the grid level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of the Three Gorges Dam (TGD) 
on average temperature. The unit of analysis is a 0.5 longitudinal degree * 0.5 latitudinal degree grid. All models 
are estimated following the difference-in-differences models specified as equation (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). Panel A 
shows the effects on the downstream region of the TGD. Panel B shows the effects on the reservoir of the TGD. 
Panel C shows the effects on the upstream region of the TGD. Column (1) compares grids within 100 km of the 
Yangtze River with grids that are between 100 km and 200 km away from the Yangtze River. Column (2) 
compares grids within 200km of the Yangtze River with grids that are between 200 km and 400 km away from 
the Yangtze River. Column (3) treat distance to the Yangtze River as a continuous variable. When estimating the 





Table 3.3: The Effects of the Three Gorges Dam on Extreme Precipitation Incidences 
 Droughts Floods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














Panel A: Down Stream  
After 2003× 
within 100km 
-0.015***   -0.0014   
(0.0057)   (0.0040)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 -0.0028   -0.020***  
 (0.0045)   (0.0032)  
After 2003× 
Distance 
  0.00015***   0.000 
  (0.000048)   (0.000) 
Number of 
Observations 
56100 103200 56100 56100 103200 56100 
Panel B: Reservoir  
After 2003× 
within 100km 
-0.012   -0.0015   
(0.0076)   (0.0059)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 -0.021***     
 (0.0070)   -0.0084* 0.0000 
After 2003× 
Distance 
  0.00006  (0.0045) (0.0000) 
  (0.00006)    
Number of 
Observations 
32100 60300 32100 32100 60300 32100 
Panel C: Up Stream  
After 2003× 
within 100km 
-0.020***   -0.0064   
(0.0066)   (0.0055)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 -0.023***   0.0019  
 (0.0053)   (0.0042)  
After 2003× 
Distance 
  0.00013**   0.000 
  (0.00006)   (0.000) 
Number of 
Observations 
40800 91500 40800 40800 91500 40800 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the grid level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of the Three Gorges Dam 
(TGD) on extreme rainfall incidences. Column (1) to Column (3) show the effects on droughts, which are 
defined as monthly precipitation smaller than the 15 percent percentile of the historical precipitation 
distribution in the same month and grid. Column (4) to Column (6) show the effects on floods, which are 
defined as monthly precipitation larger than the 85 percent percentile of the historical precipitation distribution 
in the same month and grid. The unit of analysis is a 0.5 longitudinal degree * 0.5 latitudinal degree grid. All 
models are estimated following the difference-in-differences model specified as equation (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). 
Panel A shows the effects on the downstream region of the TGD. Panel B shows the effects on the reservoir of 
the TGD. Panel C shows the effects on the upstream region of the TGD. Column (1) and Column (4) compare 
grids within 100 km of the Yangtze River with grids that are between 100 km and 200 km away from the 
Yangtze River. Column (2) and Column (5) compare grids within 200km of the Yangtze River with grids that 
are between 200 km and 400 km away from the Yangtze River. Column (3) and Column (6) treat the distance 




















































Table 3.4: The Effects of the Three Gorges Dam on Total Precipitation 
 Precipitation (All seasons) Precipitation (Spring) 
















Panel A: Down Stream  
After 2003× 
within 100km 
0.51   -5.53***   
(1.20)   (0.75)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 -2.08**   -11.72***  
 (1.05)   (0.91)  
After 2003× 
Distance 
  0.0098**   0.052*** 
  (0.042)   (0.0037) 
Number of 
Observations 
56100 103200 103200 14025 25800 25800 
Panel B: Reservoir  
After 2003× 
within 100km 
-2.21   -2.48**   
(1.43)   (1.23)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 2.45*   2.13**  
 (1.37)   (0.95)  
After 2003× 
Distance 
  -0.0096*   -0.0098** 
  (0.0056)   (0.0044) 
Number of 
Observations 
32100 60300 60300 8025 15075 15075 
Panel C: Up Stream  
After 2003× 
within 100km 
-0.92   -1.79*   
(1.15)   (1.12)   
After 2003× 
within 200km 
 2.87***   1.70**  
 (0.95)   (0.71)  
After 2003× 
Distance 
  -0.014***   -0.0087*** 
  (0.0038)   (0.0033) 
Number of 
Observations 
40800 91500 91500 10200 22875 22875 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the grid level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of the Three Gorges Dam 
(TGD) on total monthly precipitation. The unit of analysis is a 0.5 longitudinal degree * 0.5 latitudinal degree 
grid. All models are estimated following the difference-in-differences model specified as equation (3.1), (3.2) 
and (3.3). Panel A shows the effects on the downstream region of the TGD. Panel B shows the effects on the 
reservoir of the TGD. Panel C shows the effects on the upstream region of the TGD. Column (1) to Column (3) 
show the effects on precipitation for all seasons. Column (4) to Column (6) show the effects on precipitation 
during spring, when the impact of the TGD is the largest. Column (1) and Column (4) compare grids within 100 
km of the Yangtze River with grids that are between 100 km and 200 km away from the Yangtze River. 
Column (2) and Column (5) compare grids within 200km of the Yangtze River with grids that are between 200 
km and 400 km away from the Yangtze River. Column (3) and Column (6) treat distance to the Yangtze River 







Table 3.5: The Effects of the Three Gorges Dam on Crop Yields (kg/mu) 
 Rice Yields Wheat Yields Corn Yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Comparing 200km vs. 400km (Decrease in Precipitation) 
After 2003×within 
200km 
-0.12*** -0.12* -0.023 -0.039 -0.094 -0.14** 
(0.043) (0.067) (0.063) (0.072) (0.18) (0.069) 
Controlling for Inputs N Y N Y N Y 
Number of Villages 80 80 61 56 50 35 
Number of Observations 65268 41118 37346 23538 17131 7873 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of the Three Gorges Dam 
(TGD) on crop yields. The unit of analysis is a household. All models estimate the effects of the TGD in the 
downstream region following the difference-in-differences model specified as equation (3.4). Column (1) and 
Column (2) estimate the effects on the yields of rice. Column (3) and Column (4) estimate the effects on the 
yields of wheat. Column (5) and Column (6) estimate the effects on the yields of corn. All models compare 
grids within 200km of the Yangtze River with grids that are between 200 km and 400 km away from the 
Yangtze River. All models control for the total area of land. Column (2), Column (4) and Column (6) 








Table 3.6: Heterogenous Effects on Rice Yields 
 Rice Yields 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A: By the Range of Effects 







Number of Observations 5861 57449 
Panel B: By the Type of Terrain 





Number of Observations 20523 42787 
Panel C: By Water Scarcity 





Number of Observations 27147 36163 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the heterogenous effects of the Three 
Gorges Dam (TGD) on rice yields. The unit of analysis is a household. All models estimate the effects of the 
TGD in the downstream region following the difference-in-differences model specified as equation (3.4). Panel A 
estimates the effects of the TGD by whether the longitude of the village is smaller than 113 degrees or larger than 
113 degrees. Panel B estimates the effects of the TGD by the type of the Terrain (Flat or Hilly) of the village. 
Panel C estimates the effects of the TGD by whether the village is categorized as a place where water is scarce.  
All models compare grids within 200km of the Yangtze River with grids that are between 200 km and 400 km 








Table 3.7: The Effects of the Three Gorges Dam on Adaptation 






















0.16* -0.012 -0.021 0.019 0.20* 0.022 
(0.097) (0.048) (0.14) (0.091) (0.11) （0.29） 
Number of 
Villages 
82 94 92 93 93 94 
Number of 
Observations 
65812 114396 81597 87620 91939 114396 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of the Three Gorges Dam (TGD) 
on adaptation. The unit of analysis is a household. All models estimate the effects of the TGD in the downstream 
region following the difference-in-differences model specified as equation (3.4). Column (1) estimates the effects 
on the total cultivation area of rice. Column (2) estimates the effects on whether the household grows rice or not. 
Column (3) estimates the effects on the total cultivation area of economic crops. Column (4) estimates the effects 
on the total cultivation area of food crops. Column (5) estimates the effects on total agricultural labor input. 
Column (6) estimates the effects on total out migration. All dependent variables are in logarithm. All models 
compare grids within 200km of the Yangtze River with grids that are between 200 km and 400 km away from the 






Table 3.8: The Effects of the Three Gorges Dam on Crop Yields (Adding Policy Controls) 
 Rice Yields Wheat Yields Corn Yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
After 2003×within 
200km 
-0.12*** -0.12* -0.049 -0.068 -0.055 -0.14** 
(0.043) (0.068) (0.073) (0.091) (0.13) (0.064) 
Controlling for Inputs N Y N Y N Y 
Controlling for Policies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of Villages 80 80 61 56 50 35 
Number of Observations 65268 41118 37346 23538 17131 7873 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of the Three Gorges Dam (TGD) 
on crop yields by adding additional policy controls. The unit of analysis is a household. Model specifications are 
the same as Table 3.5. In addition to Table 3.5, all models control for three economic policies that may affect the 
main results: agricultural tax reform, property rights reform (Chari et al., 2017) and the policy aiming at returning 




Figure 3.1: Differences in Climate Variables along the Three Gorges Dam by Longitude 
Figure 3.1.1: Differences in Average Temperature by Longitude (100km v.s. 200km) 
 







































































































Figure 3.1.3: Differences in Total Precipitation in Spring by Longitude (200km v.s. 400km) 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effects of the Three Georges Dam (TGD) on average temperature, extreme 
precipitation incidences and total precipitation along the Yangtze river. The horizontal axis denotes the longitudinal 
degree of the grids. The vertical axis shows the coefficients from the difference-in-differences empirical model 
specified as equation (3.5) estimated using data from each longitudinal degree. Regions within the vertical red lines 
denote the reservoir of the TGD. Figure 3.1.1 shows the effects on temperature. Figure 3.1.2 shows the effects on 





Figure 3.2: Differences in Precipitation over Seasons 
Figure 3.2.1: Differences in Precipitation over Months 
 
Figure 3.2.2: Differences in Runoff from Yangtze River over Months 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effects of the Three Georges Dam on precipitation by month (season). Figure 3.2.1 
shows the effects in different months. Figure 3.2.2 shows the difference in runoff from Yangtze River by month. 
The vertical axis shows the coefficients from the difference-in-differences empirical model specified as equation 





Figure 3.3: The Effects of the Three Gorges Dam on Climate over Time 
Figure 3.3.1: Differences in Average Temperature over Time (100km vs.. 200km) 
 







Figure 3.3.3: Differences in Total Precipitation in Spring over Time (200km vs.. 400km) 
 
Notes: This figure shows the effects of the Three Georges Dam (TGD) on temperature, precipitation and extreme 
precipitation incidences over time. The horizontal axis denotes years from 1991 to 2014, with 2003 as the treatment 
year of the dam. The default comparison year is 1990.The vertical axis shows the coefficients estimated following 
equation (3.5) for each year. Figure 3.3.1 shows the effects on temperature. Figure 3.3.2 shows the effects on 























Figure 3.4.1: Yields of Rice Figure 3.4.2: Yields of Wheat 
 
 
Figure 3.4.3: Yields of Corn  
Notes: This figure shows the effects of the Three Georges Dam (TGD) on crop yields over time. The horizontal 
axis denotes years from 1996 to 2014, with 2003 as the treatment year of the dam. The default comparison year is 
1995.The vertical axis shows the coefficients estimated following equation (3.5) for each year. Figure 3.4.1 shows 
the effects on the yields of rice. Figure 3.4.2 shows the effects on the yields of wheat. Figure 3.4.3 shows the 
effects on the yields of Corn. All models compare villages within 200km of the Yangtze River with villages that 





















































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Adaptation in the Inputs of Rice Production due to the Decrease in 
Precipitation 
  
Figure 3.5.1: Irrigation Expenditure Figure 3.5.2: Labor Input 
  
Figure 3.5.3: Land Input Figure 3.5.4: Machinery Input 
Notes: This figure shows the effects of the Three Georges Dam (TGD) on the structure of agricultural inputs. The 
horizontal axis denotes years from 2004 to 2014. The default comparison year is 2003.The vertical axis shows the 
coefficients estimated following equation (3.5) for each year. Figure 3.5.1 shows the effects on irrigation 
expenditure. Figure 3.5.2 shows the effects on labor input. Figure 3.5.3 shows the effects on land input. Figure 3.5.4 
shows the effects on machinery input. All models compare villages within 200km of the Yangtze River with villages 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS FOR CHAPTER ONE 
A1. TFP Estimation using Non-Parametric Method 
Following Ackerberg et al. (2015), I use the following procedures to non-parametrically estimate 
labor and capital share (β𝐿 and β𝑘) in the production function. Then, I replace 𝑆𝑓?̃? with β𝐿 and 
1 − 𝑆𝑓?̃? with β𝑘 in equation (1.7) to get TFP. 
Suppose empirical production function is specified as y = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑙 × 𝑙 + 𝛽𝑘 × 𝑘 + 𝜔 + , where 
y denotes the logarithm of value added, 𝑙 denotes the logarithm of labor input and 𝑘 denotes the 
logarithm of capital input. 𝜔 denotes TFP which is unobservable to the researcher.  denotes 
random productivity shock. 
I use the following procedures to get 𝛽?̂? and 𝛽?̂?: 
(1) Non-parametrically regress y on 𝑙, 𝑘 and intermediary input and get predicted ŷ =
?̂?(𝑙, 𝑘, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡); 
(2) Then TFP 𝜔 can be estimated as ?̂? = ?̂?(𝑙, 𝑘, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡) − 𝛽0 − 𝛽𝑙 × 𝑙 − 𝛽𝑘 × 𝑘. 
(3) Assuming for each firm, 𝜔𝑡 = 𝜌𝜔𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡, where 𝑢𝑡 denotes exogenous productivity shock, 
given parameters 𝜌, 𝛽0, 𝛽𝑙 and 𝛽𝑘, ?̂?𝑡, ?̂?𝑡−1 and  𝑢?̂? can be calculated from the data.  
(4) Using the moment condition that 𝑢?̂? is orthogonal to 1,𝑙𝑡−1, 𝑘𝑡 and ?̂?(𝑙, 𝑘, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡)𝑡−1 and 











A2. Other Maps of Dialect Zones 
Figure A1: Map of Dialect zones with Major Rivers: 
 
 






Figure A2: Map of Other Dialect Zones around this Area 
 













A3. The Employment Share of HMT Firms at the Border of the Wu Dialect Zone  
(Placebo Test) 
Figure A3: The Employment Share of HMT Firms at the Border of the Wu Dialect Zone 
 
Notes: This figure shows the share of HMT firms among all firms at each zip code by distance to the Wu dialect 
border. All zip codes within 40 kilometers are included in the analysis. The horizontal axis denotes distance to the 
Wu dialect border with negative value indicating the zip code is located inside the border. Vertical axis denotes 
average share of HMT firms for a given distance. The share of HMT firms is standardized by subtracting county 





 A4. The Share of Regulated Industries at the Dialect Borders 
Figure A4: The Share of Regulated Industries at the Dialect Borders 
 
Notes: When studying the effects of common dialect by industrial entry regulation, one concern is that the intensity 
of regulation may change discontinuously at the borders. To address this issue, I plot the geographical distribution of 
the employment share of regulated industries among all industries. Figure A4 shows the employment share of 
regulated industries among all industries at each zip code by distance to common dialect borders. All zip codes 
within 40 kilometers are included in the analysis. The horizontal axis denotes distance to the common dialect 
borders with negative value indicating the zip code is located inside the borders. The vertical axis denotes the 
average share of regulated industries for a given distance. The Share of regulated industries is standardized by 
subtracting county mean and dividing by county standard deviation. From this figure, I find no evidence to suggest 






A5. The Effects of Common Dialect on the Level of Employment and Output by Firm Type 
 
  
Table A5: The Effects of Common Dialect on the Level of Employment and Output by  
Firm Type 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 HMT Domestic Other foreign 
Panel A:  Dependent Variable: ln (Total Employment) 
Common Dialect 0.44 -0.46* -0.18 
 (0.30) (0.24) (0.27) 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: ln (Total Output) 
Common Dialect 0.57** -0.90*** -0.39 
 (0.24) (0.34) (0.49) 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, distance to Hong Kong or Taipei 
Observations 7067 7067 7067 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on 
total employment and output by types of firms. Column (1) to (3) are estimated using the local linear model 
[model (4)] and bandwidth is chosen to be 30km. Column (1) shows the effects on HMT firms. Column (2) 
shows the effects on Domestic firms. Column (3) shows the effects on other foreign firms. Panel A uses the 
logarithm of total employment of a zip code as the dependent variable. Panel B uses the logarithm of total output 




A6. Identify both Horizontal and Vertical Spillovers 
In addition to the horizontal spillovers estimated in section 1.4.3, industrial variation in 
regulation interacted with dialect borders allows me to also estimate vertical spillovers 
(spillovers to domestic suppliers and buyers). 
 The baseline model that include both horizontal and vertical spillovers can be specified 
as: 
ln(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡) = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜇2𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 +
𝜇3𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡，   （A6.1） 
where 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡 captures the presence of HMT firms in the same industry 
and location as firm 𝑓; 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 captures the presence of HMT firms in 
industries that are supplied by industry k (downstream industries of industry k) in zip code i and 
year t; 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 captures the presence of HMT firms in industries that supply to 
industry k (upstream industries of industry k) in zip code i and year t. As a result, 𝜇1 captures 
horizontal spillovers; 𝜇2 captures spillovers from HMT firms to domestic suppliers in the same 
zip code (backward linkage); while 𝜇3 captures spillovers from HMT firms to domestic buyers in 
the same zip code (forward linkage).  
 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 can be defined as a weight average of HMT output share for 
all downstream industries of industry k: 
 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑢𝑘
∑ 𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑝𝑝∈Ω𝑖𝑢𝑡 ×𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑝
∑ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑝∈Ω𝑖𝑢𝑡
 𝑢 𝑖𝑓 𝑢≠𝑘 ,     (A6.2) 
where 𝑢 denotes all downstream industries of industry k and weight 𝛼𝑢𝑘 is the proportion of 
industry k’s output supplied to industry u taken from the 2002 input-output table at the two-digit 
industry level. The HMT output share is calculated in the same way as equation (1.9), which is 
HMT equity weighted total output over total output.  
 Similarly, 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 is defined as a weighted average of HMT output 
share (excluding export) for all upstream industries of industry k: 
𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 = ∑ 𝜃𝑣𝑘  
∑ 𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑞𝑞∈Ω𝑖𝑣𝑡 ×(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑞−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑞)
∑ (𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑞−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑞𝑞∈Ω𝑖𝑣𝑡 )
𝑣 𝑖𝑓 𝑣≠𝑘 ,   (A6. 3) 
where 𝑣 denotes all upstream industries of industry k and weight 𝜃𝑣𝑘 is the proportion of industry 
k’s input supplied by industry 𝑣 taken from the 2002 input-output table at the two-digit industry 
level. The HMT output share is calculated in a similar way to equation (A6.2) except that export 
need to be excluded when calculating linkage to domestic upstream industries.  
 To solve the endogeneity problem in equation (A6.1), I use dialect borders and dialect 
borders interacted with regulation policies as the instruments for 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑡,  
𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡 and 𝐻𝑀𝑇_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑘𝑡. Specifically I use the following four 
instruments: 𝑇𝑖, 𝑅𝑘𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖, ∑ 𝛼𝑢𝑘𝑅𝑢𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑢 𝑖𝑓 𝑢≠𝑘  and ∑ 𝜃𝑣𝑘𝑅𝑣𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑣 𝑖𝑓 𝑢≠𝑘  , where 𝑇𝑖 indicates 
whether location i is in the common dialect area and 𝑅𝑘𝑡 indicates whether industry k is regulated 
in year t. Section 1.4.2 shows that entry-regulation does generate heterogeneous effects across 




∑ 𝛼𝑢𝑘𝑅𝑢𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑢 𝑖𝑓 𝑢≠𝑘  measures the regulation status of all downstream industries of industry 𝑘 
interacted with common dialect, which helps to identify the backward linkage parameter 𝜇2; 
∑ 𝜃𝑣𝑘𝑅𝑣𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑣 𝑖𝑓 𝑢≠𝑘  measures the regulation status of all upstream industries of industry 𝑘 
interacted with common dialect, which helps to identify the forward linkage parameter 𝜇3 . In the 
full model, I also include additional control variables as follows: 𝑅𝑘𝑡 measures the regulation 
status of industry k;∑ 𝛼𝑢𝑘𝑅𝑢𝑡𝑢 𝑖𝑓 𝑢≠𝑘  measures the regulation status of industry k’s downstream 
industries and ∑ 𝜃𝑢𝑘𝑅𝑢𝑡𝑢 𝑖𝑓 𝑢≠𝑘  measure the regulation status of industry k’s upstream industries. 
Results estimated using equation (A6.1) with instruments are shown as Column (1) and 
(2) of Table A6.1. I report the estimated results of 𝜇1 (horizontal spillovers), 𝜇2(backward 
linkages) and 𝜇3 (forward linkages) from equation (A6.1). The coefficients representing 
horizontal spillovers are estimated to be positive and the coefficients representing both backward 
and forward linkages are estimated to be negative. Yet all coefficients are imprecisely estimated 
and statistically insignificant. This is mainly because we have a very weak first stage when 
predicting the presence of HMT firms in downstream and upstream industries.  
Table A6.2 shows the results from the first stage. I find that even though the interaction 
between dialect and regulation can strongly predict the presence of HMT firms in the same 
industry, the interactions between common dialect and regulation in downstream and upstream 
industries are not strong instruments for the presence of HMT firms in downstream and upstream 
industries. Also, the coefficients on the interaction between common dialect and upstream 
regulation has a positive effect on the share of the presence of HMT firm in upstream industries, 
which is not consistent with expectation. Therefore, using the empirical framework and the 
sample of this research, I do not have the power to clearly identify vertical spillovers using the 







Table A6.1: Horizontal and Vertical Spillovers from HMT Firms to Domestic Firms  
(GMM IV estimation) 




Horizontal Spillovers 4.00 2.74 
 (5.35) (3.93) 
Backward Spillovers -10.35 -12.31 
 （29.98） (22.42) 
Forward Spillovers -17.09 -7.48 
 (21.18) (14.69) 
First Stage  Table A6.2 Table A6.2 
    (Common Dialect)   
Observations 33589 33589 
Control variables 
County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, 
distance to Hong Kong or Taipei, Firms’ age, capital-labor ratio, 
log(output), log(export). 
Additional control variables for column (3) and (4): Regulation 
status of industry k, downstream industries of industry k and 
upstream industries of industry k.  
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.This table shows horizontal and vertical spillovers from 
HMT investment to domestic firms in the same zip code and industry. Column (1) and (2) jointly estimate 
horizontal and vertical spillovers using equation (A6.1) with instruments. Local linear model is estimated using 
30km as the optimal bandwidth. Column (1) uses TFP calculated following the framework of Brandt et al. 
(2012) and Column (2) uses TFP calculated using non-parametric method following Ackerberg et al. (2015) as 




Table A6.2: First-Stage Results of Table A6.1 









Common Dialect 0.0005 0.0045 0.0054 
 (0.04) (0.0037) (0.014) 
Common Dialect× -0.098** -0.0075 -0.022 
    Regulation （0.039） (0.009) (0.014) 
Common Dialect× 0.027 -0.015 0.013 
    Downstream Regulation (0.080) (0.022) (0.024) 
Common Dialect× 0.025*** 0.029 0.030 
    Upstream Regulation (0.054) (0.022) (0.022) 
Observations 33589 33589 33589 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This stable shows first-stage results of Table A6.1. Only 






A7. Results of Table 1.11 with Low HMT Share in Own, Down-stream and Up-stream industries 
This section shows an extension of the placebo test conducted in Table 1.11. In Table 1.11, I 
conduct a placebo test using industries with low HMT investment share, assuming that domestic 
firms from these industries are not affected by investment from HMT. However, domestic firms 
can still be affected by the presence of HMT firms in downstream and upstream industries, even 
though I do not find statistically significant vertical spillovers. Therefore, I conduct an additional 
placebo test using industries with low HMT presence in own, downstream and upstream 
industries.  
 Table A7 shows the estimation results using the same empirical specification as Table 
1.12. The model is estimated using firms from industries which are chosen such that the share of 
HMT firms in these industries, the share of HMT firms in the downstream industries of these 
industries and the share of HMT firms in the upstream industries of these industries are smaller 
than 5 percent. 5 percent is chosen to maintain a reasonable sample size. Then, TFP is regressed 
on the dummy variable indicating common dialect. As a result, I find no discontinuous changes 
in the productivity of domestic firms across the borders in these industries, indicating that the 
productivity of domestic firms is the same if they do not receive influence from HMT firms.  
  Table A7: The Effects of Common Dialect on the Productivity of Domestic Firms  
 Dependent Variable: ln(TFP) 
 HMT share<0.05 
Backward Share <0.05 
Forward Share<0.05 
Common dialect -0.076 
(0.062) 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, 
distance to Hong Kong or Taipei, Firms’ age, log(output), 
capital-labor ratio, log(export). 
Observations 16919 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common 
dialect on the productivity of domestic firms from industries with low HMT presence in own, 
downstream and upstream industries. The dependent variable is the TFP of domestic firms. The table 




A8. The Effects of Common Dialect on Total employment and Output 
One of the major identification assumptions of this study is that factors other than dialect should 
change continuously at the dialect borders. One potential concern is that the degree of economic 
development might be very different across the border. Therefore, I conduct an additional 
placebo test using measures of the total size of the industrial sector (for example total industrial 
output and total employment) as the dependent variable and expect to show that there are no 
discontinuous changes in the total scale of industrial sector across borders. However, this is not a 
clean placebo test, because investment from HMT can affect economic growth and thus generate 
differentiation in economic development in the long-run. 
 Table A8 reports the results of zip code level analysis (Model (3) and (4)) with total 
industrial employment and output of zip code i as the dependent variable. Table A8 shows that 
zip codes inside the common dialect zones tend to have higher total industrial employment and 
output, but the differences are statistically insignificant. Moreover, when the bandwidth becomes 
smaller, the difference in total size of industrial sector also shrinks to close to zero. Therefore, I 
do not find discontinuous changes in the total size of industrial sector at the dialect borders. 
  
Table A8: Common Dialect on Total Industrial Production  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local linear 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: ln(Employment) 
Common Dialect 0.06 0.22 0.27 0.44 0.024 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.35) (0.48) (0.20) 
Optimal Bandwidth     30 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: ln(Output) 
Common Dialect -0.079 0.25 0.41 0.71 -0.008 
 (0.19) (0.29) (0.41) (0.57) (0.22) 
Optimal Bandwidth     30 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, distance to Hong Kong or 
Taipei 
Observations 9456 9456 9456 9456 7067 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on total 
output and employment. Column (1) to (4) are estimated using equation (1.3), Column (5) is estimated using 
equation (1.4) with bandwidth shown in the table.  From column (1) to (4), first to fourth degree polynomials of 
distance to the borders are used as control variables. Estimated coefficients 𝛽1 , which are the measure of 
discontinuous changes at the borders, are reported in the table. Panel A uses logarithm of total employment as 




A9. Results of Table 1.2 with only the Min Dialect Border 
  
Table A9: Common Dialect on the Share of HMT Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local linear 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Employment share 
Common Dialect 0.065 0.073 0.080 0.12 0.078* 
 (0.043) (0.056) (0.072) (0.097) (0.046) 
Optimal Bandwidth     30 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Output share 
Common Dialect 0.057 0.084 0.13* 0.13 0.075* 
 (0.042) (0.056) (0.072) (0.093) (0.045) 
Optimal Bandwidth     30 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, distance to Hong Kong or 
Taipei 
Observations 2212 2212 2212 2212 1632 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on the share 
of HMT firms using only variation at the Min dialect border. Models are estimated following the spatial 
regression discontinuity design using a sample of zip codes within 40 kilometers of the Min dialect border. The 
dependent variable is the total employment (output) of HMT firms over total employment (output) of all firms 
for each zip code. The coefficients that capture the discontinuous increase in the outcome variables at the 
common dialect borders are shown in the table. Column (1) to column (4) estimate model (3) by controlling the 
first to fourth degree polynomials of distance to the dialect borders respectively. Column (5) estimate a local 
linear model with optimal bandwidth chosen using cross validation. Panel A uses employment share as the 




A10. Results from a Difference-in-Differences Identification Strategy 
This section shows estimation results of spillover effects using difference-in-differences (DID) 
identification strategy. The regression discontinuity design (RD) used in the main text reduces 
endogeneity concern through comparing locations that are geographically very close. Therefore, 
the cost of applying the RD design is a small sample size that affects the precision of estimation. 
As mentions in the main text, the vertical spillover effects are not precisely estimated due to the 
small sample size around the dialect borders. Thus, this section re-estimate spillover effects 
using DID identification strategy, which requires different identification assumptions and can 
include more observations to increase the power of estimation. 
 The DID identification strategy explores variation in dialect and industrial level entry-
regulation policies. The empirical model of the first stage can be specified as follows: 
𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑘𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑘𝑡 + 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡      (𝐴10.1)  , 
where 𝑇𝑖 denotes whether location i speaks the same dialect as Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan 
(HMT),  𝑅𝑘𝑡 denotes whether industry k receives entry-regulation policy in year t. 𝑍𝑓𝑖𝑘𝑡 denotes 
firm level control variables. 𝜂𝑡 and 𝛿𝑘 are year and industry fixed effects. Model (A10.1) 
corresponds to Model (5) in the RD design. There are several major differences. First, the 
analysis is not restricted to a bandwidth of 40km. All zip codes are included in the analysis to 
increase power of estimation at a cost of reducing cleanness of identification, because the 
treatment group and control group become less comparable. Second, distance to the dialect 
borders are no longer controlled in the model. Finally, county fixed effects are removed because 
we no longer explore variation within the same county when using the DID strategy. 
 The estimation results of Model (A10.1) are shown in Table A10.1. I find that the 
coefficient on common dialect is positive and statistically significant and the coefficient on the 
interaction term between common dialect and entry-regulation is negative and statistically 
significant. These findings indicate that speaking the same dialect increases investment from 
HMT and the effect is larger in unregulated industries. The findings are qualitatively consistent 
with the conclusions from the RD design. However, in terms of magnitude, the coefficient on the 
common dialect dummy variable in the DID design (16 percent) is much larger the RD design (5 
to 7 percent). The difference in magnitude indicates that other unobservable factors start to affect 
investment when we move away from the dialect borders. The DID strategy incorporates 
locations that are not closely comparable with each other in unobservable characteristics. 
Therefore, the DID strategy suffers more from the endogeneity problems even though it can 
increase the power of estimation. 
 Then, I use the results from Model (A10.1) to estimate horizontal and vertical spillovers 
following equation (A6.1). Horizontal, backward and forward spillovers are instrumented by four 
instruments: the common dialect dummy variable, common dialect interacted with entry-
regulation of industry k, common dialect interacted with entry-regulation of downstream 
industries of industry k and common dialect interacted with entry-regulation of upstream 
industries of industry k. The estimation results are shown in Table A10.2. Most coefficients are 




entry-regulation still do not generate enough variation to clearly identify all vertical spillovers 
even though the sample size is significantly enlarged when all zip codes are included into the 
analysis. 
  
Table A10.1: Common Dialect and FDI Entry Regulation on HMT equity share  
(DID specification) 
 Dependent Variable: HMT equity share 
Common Dialect (𝛽1) 0.16*** 
 (0.0077) 
Common Dialect*FDI   




Control variables Year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, Firms ‘age, log(output), 
capital-labor ratio, log(export). 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect and entry-
regulation policy on investment from HMT using DID specification. The model I follow is Model A10.1. All zip 
codes from the eight southern Chinese provinces are included in the sample (Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, 















Table A10.2: Spillovers on the Productivity of Domestic Firms (DID specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 




1.28*** 1.00*** 9.74 
(0.22) (0.15) (7.70) 
Backward Spillover 
  -54.06 
  (36.11) 
Forward Spillover 
  29.03* 
  (16.40) 
Observations 509704 509704 509704 
Control variables 
Year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, Firms ‘age, log(output), 
capital-labor ratio, log(export). 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the horizontal and vertical spillovers of 
investment from HMT on the productivity of domestic firms. The model is estimated using equation (A10.1). 




A11.The Effects of Common Dialect on the Share of HMT Firms with Different Bandwidth 
  
Table A11: The Effects of Common Dialect on the Share of HMT Firms  
(Different bandwidth): 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 
Dependent Variables: HMT Employment Share 
Border specifications: 
<20km of dialect borders 0.045 0.057 0.129* 
 (0030) (0.048) (0.068) 
<30km of dialect borders 0.070*** 0.040 0.061 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.055) 
<50km of dialect borders 0.052*** 0.045 0.104** 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.041) 
<60km of dialect borders 0.043** 0.056** 0.068* 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.036) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on the 
employment share of HMT firms with various definitions of bandwidth (from 20 to 60km). Columns (1) to (3) 
are estimated using equation (1.3) with various degree of polynomials of distance to the borders as control 
variables. Estimated coefficients 𝛽1 , which are the measure of discontinuous changes at the border, are reported 




A12. Additional Effects on Crowding-out 
This section shows additional evidence on crowding-out of domestic firms. Table A12.1 estimate 
equation (1.5) and (1.6) with the dependent variable changed to domestic equity share of a 
specific firm. From Table A12.1, we find that the coefficients on the common dialect dummy 
variable are generally negative, the coefficients on the interaction between common dialect and 
FDI regulation are positive and the coefficients on the interaction between common dialect and 
the productivity of HMT firms are negative. Thus, we can conclude that the share of domestic 
firms decreases at the dialect borders and the discontinuous decrease is larger in magnitude in 
industries not under FDI entry-regulation and in industries in which HMT firms are more 
productive. Because the effects on domestic firms are exactly in contrary to the effects on HMT 
firms in signs, we interpret this evidence as showing that domestic firms are crowed out of the 
market by the entry of HMT firms at the borders of the dialect zones. 
 Similarly, in Table A12.2 I analyze the effects of common dialect on the share of other 
foreign firms by industries. Most of the estimates are statistically insignificant, indicating that 








Table A12.1: Heterogeneous Effects of Common Dialect on the Share of Domestic Firms by 
Industry (FDI Regulation and Productivity of HMT firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local 
linear 
Dependent Variable:  Domestic equity share 
Panel A: By whether the industry is under FDI entry-regulation 
Common Dialect  -0.085** -0.12** -0.073 -0.042 -0.12*** 
 (0.040) (0.057) (0.074) (0.082) (0.044) 
Common Dialect*FDI  
    Regulation  
0.065* 0.067* 0.068* 0.070* 0.044 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) 
Bandwidth 
Observations 
    30 
58060 77537 77537 77537 77537 
Panel B: By the productivity of HMT firms for each industry 
Common Dialect -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.14* -0.12 -0.21*** 
 (0.053) (0.069) (0.084) (0.089) (0.053) 
Common Dialect*Produ 
    -ctivity of HMT firms 
-0.34*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.41*** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Bandwidth     30 
Observations 77466 77466 77466 77466 58000 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, 
distance to Hong Kong or Taipei 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on the share 
of Domestic firms in different industries. Panel A compares the effects in industries under FDI entry-regulation 
with industries not under regulation. Panel B compares the effects in industries where HMT firms are good at 
producing (high productivity) with industries where HMT firms are not good at producing (low productivity).  
All models are estimated following spatial regression discontinuity design using a sample of firms within 40 
kilometers of the dialect borders [model (5) and model (6)]. The dependent variable is HMT equity share for 
each firm. Column (1) to column (4) estimate the models by controlling the first to fourth degree polynomials of 
distance to the dialect borders respectively. Column (5) estimate a local linear model with bandwidth chosen to 
be 30 km. In panel A, I report the coefficients on the common dialect dummy variable and the coefficients on the 
interaction between common dialect and whether the industry is under FDI regulation. Similarly, in panel B, I 
report the coefficients on the common dialect dummy variable and the interaction between common dialect and 






Table A12.2: Heterogeneous Effects of Common Dialect on the Share of Other Foreign 
Firms by Industry (FDI Regulation and Productivity of HMT firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st degree 2nd degree 3rd degree 4th degree Local linear 
Dependent Variable:  Other foreign firms’ equity share 
Panel A: By whether the industry is under FDI entry-regulation 
Common Dialect  0.020 0.035* 0.016 -0.015 0.028* 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.027) (0.029) (0.016) 
Common Dialect*FDI  
    Regulation  
-0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 -0.0072 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Bandwidth 
Observations 
    30 
58060 77537 77537 77537 77537 
Panel B: By the productivity of HMT firms for each industry 
Common Dialect 0.019 0.035 0.016 -0.014 0.029** 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.028) (0.032) (0.014) 
Common 
Dialect*Produ 
    -ctivity of HMT 
firms 
0.014 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.012 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.0370 (0.035) 
Bandwidth     30 
Observations 77466 77466 77466 77466 58000 
Control variables County fixed effects, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, 
distance to Hong Kong or Taipei 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at zip code level are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. This table shows the effects of common dialect on the 
share of firms from other countries in different industries. Panel A compares the effects in industries under FDI 
entry-regulation with industries not under regulation. Panel B compares the effects in industries where HMT 
firms are good at producing (high productivity) with industries where HMT firms are not good at producing 
(low productivity).  All models are estimated following spatial regression discontinuity design using a sample 
of firms within 40 kilometers of the dialect borders [model (5) and model (6)]. The dependent variable is HMT 
equity share for each firm. Column (1) to column (4) estimate the models by controlling the first to fourth 
degree polynomials of distance to the dialect borders respectively. Column (5) estimate a local linear model 
with bandwidth chosen to be 30 km. In panel A, I report the coefficients on the common dialect dummy 
variable and the coefficients on the interaction between common dialect and whether the industry is under FDI 
regulation. Similarly, in panel B, I report the coefficients on the common dialect dummy variable and the 




A13. The Geographical Distribution of Temperature and Precipitation across the Dialect Borders 
Figure A5. The Geographical Distribution of Average Temperature and Precipitation 





Notes: These figures show the geographical distribution of average temperature and precipitation by distance to the 
dialect borders. The data are from Terrestrial Air Temperature 1900-2010 Gridded Monthly Time Series and 
Terrestrial Precipitation 1900-2010 Gridded Monthly Time Series. The resolution is at 0.5 by 0.5 degree (about 
55km). 
 
